End of an Error: Replacing Manifest Disregard with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, The by Davis, Kenneth R.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2012
End of an Error: Replacing Manifest Disregard with
a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration
Awards, The
Kenneth R. Davis
Fordham University Graduate School of Business
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth R. Davis, End of an Error: Replacing Manifest Disregard with a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, The, 60 Clev.





THE END OF AN ERROR: REPLACING “MANIFEST 
DISREGARD” WITH A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
REVIEWING ARBITRATION AWARDS 
KENNETH R. DAVIS* 
  
 II. MANIFEST DISREGARD: EMERGENCE AND CONFIRMATION ... 92 
A. Wilko v. Swan: The Confusion Begins.......................... 92 
 III. HALL STREET V. MATTEL: CONFUSION CONFIRMED ................ 97 
A. The Hall Street Case ...................................................... 97 
1. The Supreme Court Decision: Obfuscation............ 99 
2. Other Possible Interpretations of the Wilko  
 Dicta ..................................................................... 101 
B. The Divided Reaction to Hall Street ............................ 103 
1. Manifest Disregard as a Nonstatutory Ground  
 of Review ............................................................. 104 
2. Manifest Disregard as a Statutory Ground of  
 Review.................................................................. 105 
 IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S LAPSE INTO SELF- 
  CONTRADICTION .................................................................. 106 
A. Judicial Hostility Toward Arbitration Agreements ..... 106 
B. A Change of Policy ...................................................... 108 
1. McMahon and Gilmer: The Shift Toward  
 Expanded Review................................................. 108 
2. Expedience over Principle.................................... 110 
3. Synthesis............................................................... 110 
4. Reactions of the Lower Courts............................. 111 
C. The Purpose of the FAA............................................... 114 
D. Policy Considerations.................................................. 116 
E. Statutory Rationale ...................................................... 118 
 V. STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS AND BEYOND ................... 119 
1. Facts and Procedural Background........................ 120 
2. The Supreme Court’s Distortion of “Manifest  
 Disregard” ............................................................ 121 
                                                          
*
 Professor and Area Chair of Law and Ethics, Fordham University Graduate School of 
Business; J.D., University of Toledo, School of Law, 1977; M.A., University of California, 
Long Beach, 1971; B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1969. Without the 
research support of my wife, Jean, who worked tirelessly on many a sunny weekend, I would 
probably still be stuck on the first paragraph of the introduction. Jean is the Nastia Liukin of 
law librarians, a skillful and agile researcher who turns somersaults around all the others. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
88 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:87 
 
B. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: All Hope  
 Lost? ............................................................................ 124 
C. The Public Policy Exception........................................ 125 
D. All Other Cases............................................................ 127 
E. Reduced Efficiency ...................................................... 129 
 VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 130 
44 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Anyone who has walked into a courthouse knows that litigation carries a heavy 
price tag.  Lawsuits take a lot of time and cost a lot of money.  Rights that abound in 
litigation not only protect parties but also burden them.  The American judicial 
system is replete with discovery, motion practice, and appeals that can prolong cases 
for years and result in astronomical attorneys’ fees.1  Arbitration is a way out of the 
courthouse.  It is a voluntary method of alternative dispute resolution that enables the 
parties to a conflict to avoid the wasteful complexities of the judicial system.2  There 
is a price tag here too: sacrificing procedural and substantive rights. 
Passed in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)3 repudiated a history of 
judicial hostility toward arbitration and made arbitration agreements enforceable.4  
This pro-arbitration statute sought to afford merchants and businesspersons such as 
the buyers and sellers of textiles, produce, and raw materials an efficient alternative 
to litigation.5  No one could have imagined that arbitration would evolve into a 
forum where the submission of securities law claims and civil rights claims would 
become commonplace.  The trend of arbitrating federal statutory claims caused a 
battle of conflicting policies.  The policies advanced in securities law, civil rights 
law, and other federal statutes argued for significant court involvement in the arbitral 
process.  One of the fundamental policies of the FAA—promoting efficiency in 
arbitration—argued for limited court participation. 
Virtually everyone agreed that the courts had to have some role in reviewing 
awards for procedural improprieties.  No one could seriously quarrel with 
empowering courts to vacate awards issued by corrupt arbitrators or arbitrators who 
                                                          
 
1
 See Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration: Autonomy, Cooperation and 
Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 167-68 (1999) [hereinafter “A Model 
for Arbitration”] (pointing out abusive litigation tactics that raise fees and consume time); 
Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986) (remarking that discovery can delay cases for 
years); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 
(1984) (lambasting attorneys for abusing discovery to delay lawsuits). 
 
2
 Edward Brunet & Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 459, 462 (2008) (describing arbitration as an informal and private adjudicatory 
process “involving reasoned presentations of proof to one or more expert arbitrators.”).   
 
3
 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2006).  
 
4
 See Part IV.A infra (discussing the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine). 
 
5
 See Part IV.C infra (discussing the role of arbitration at the time the FAA was enacted). 
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denied parties fair hearings.6  Disagreement focused on the scope of judicial review 
for errors of law committed by arbitrators.  Some commentators have argued that 
because arbitration is a substitute for litigation, the courts should exercise at least 
some review of substantive errors of law.7  Others have countered that the policy of 
efficiency, which animates arbitration, forecloses judges from meddling with 
arbitration awards.8   
Decided in 1953, Wilko v. Swan9 was the first case to address this conflict.  In 
Wilko, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow the arbitration of federal 
securities fraud claims brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.10  
Defending its holding that public policy forbade arbitrators to decide such claims, 
the Court observed in dicta that the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration 
awards was too meager to ensure that the rights provided in § 12(2) would protect 
victims of securities fraud.11  The Wilko opinion suggested that a court could not 
vacate an award for errors “in the interpretations of the law by arbitrators” unless the 
errors showed “manifest disregard” of the law.12  Although the Court’s nebulous 
comment offered scant guidance on what it meant by “manifest disregard,” this 
puzzling phrase so impressed the federal courts that one by one they adopted 
manifest disregard of the law as a narrow standard of review for errors of law in 
arbitration awards.13  The most common view of the doctrine was that an arbitrator 
                                                          
 
6
 See Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 10(3) (2006).  Section 10 of the FAA 
provides that a district court, upon motion, may vacate an award: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in arbitrators, or 
either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior 
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them so that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).  
 
7
 See Part IV.C, D & E infra (arguing that plenary review for errors of law should apply 






 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 
10
 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
 
11
 Id.  
 
12
 Id. at 436-37. 
 
13
 See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 421 (2008) (listing circuit 
court cases that adopted the manifest disregard standard); Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and 
Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 567 (2005) (reporting that all the federal 
circuits adopted the manifest disregard standard).  
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manifestly disregarded the law when the arbitrator knew controlling law and 
intentionally flouted it.14 
Applied to all awards, this blanket standard of review is inappropriate for 
protecting federal statutory rights such as those afforded in securities law and civil 
rights law.  The standard has also proven unworkable.  Arbitrators ordinarily do not 
provide written explanations for their awards, so courts are left to speculate on 
whether arbitrators intentionally flouted the law or merely misunderstood it.15  Even 
if an arbitrator writes a decision, he or she will conceal having intentionally 
disregarded the law, for such an admission would bring judicial rebuke and the 
outcome that all arbitrators dread—vacatur of the award. 
Over succeeding decades arbitration became more and more prevalent.  Wilko’s 
legacy of prohibiting the arbitration of federal statutory claims became an 
anachronism.  Supporting this change, the Supreme Court held in Shearson v. 
McMahon16 that securities fraud claims brought under § 10(b) could be arbitrated.17  
To justify its holding, the Court needed to refute the very point it had relied on in 
Wilko—that the scope of review of arbitration awards does not safeguard the rights 
of victims of securities fraud.  Seeming to repudiate the manifest disregard standard, 
the McMahon Court declared that the scope of review is sufficient to ensure that the 
requirements of the Act are enforced.18  Nevertheless, the federal judiciary, with few 
exceptions, continued to apply the manifest disregard standard as if the high Court 
had never decided McMahon. 
Years later, in Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,19 the Supreme Court 
held that the FAA provides the exclusive grounds for judicial review of arbitration 
awards.20  Therefore, an arbitration agreement could not expand the grounds for 
                                                          
 
14
 See, e.g., B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 
2006) (stating that the manifest disregard standard permits vacatur where there is “clear 
evidence that the arbitrator was ‘conscious of the law and deliberately ignore[d] it.’”); 
Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring 
a deliberate error of law to justify vacatur); Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 
F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a court may vacate an award under the manifest 
disregard standard where the arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.”); 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(interpreting manifest disregard to mean that the arbitrator knew the law and intentionally 
ignored it); Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 816-17 (1996) (describing the manifest 
disregard standard as requiring an intentional error of the arbitrator).   
 
15
 See Scodro, supra note 13, at 604 (noting that “a written award [is] a rarity in 
commercial arbitration”); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: 
Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 119-20 (2007) (proposing that 
arbitrators be required to write opinions explaining their awards, which would be a change 
from the customary practice); Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL 
L.Q. 519, 522 (1960) (stating that ordinarily arbitrators do not provide written opinions to 
explain the reasoning they employed in deciding the issues presented to them).  
 
16
 Shearson v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 
17
 Id. at 242. 
 
18
 Id. at 232. 
 
19
 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 577 (2008). 
 
20
 Id. at 578.    
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judicial review prescribed in the FAA.  This decision brought into question whether 
the Hall Street Court, by implication, abolished the manifest disregard standard.  The 
Court, however, did not decide this issue, but rather confused the bar with alternative 
interpretations of the ambiguous dicta in Wilko, scrambling words like eggs in a 
skillet.21  This confusion has led to conflicting judicial decisions, some courts 
holding that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street, others holding that 
Hall Street signaled the death of the manifest disregard standard.22 
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,23 the Court lapsed into self-
contradiction.  Although the court declined to decide whether the manifest disregard 
standard survived Hall Street, it professed to apply the standard arguendo.24  The 
Court, however, did not apply the manifest disregard standard, but rather applied the 
broadest standard of plenary review.  While engaging in this more searching review, 
the Stolt-Nielsen Court compounded the confusion by citing Hall Street for the 
proposition that the FAA permits only limited review for errors of law.25  Most 
recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,26 the Court suggested that the FAA 
does not permit any review for errors of law in arbitration awards, though once again 
unclear dicta assured continued uncertainty. 
Indecision and self-contradiction have served as the dubious guideposts in this 
befuddling area of law.  Nevertheless, some points are clear.  First, Concepcion 
suggests that the Supreme Court views the manifest disregard standard with disfavor.  
Second, this disfavor foreshadows the end of substantive review of arbitration 
awards.  Third, by moving in this direction, the Supreme Court has strayed from 
sound policy by rejecting the McMahon dicta.    
Guided by the purposes of the FAA, its legislative history, and the role of 
commercial arbitration in modern society, this Article proposes a new framework for 
the judicial review of arbitration awards.  Awards deciding federal statutory rights 
such as those conferred by securities law and civil rights law should be reviewed for 
errors of law.  As recognized in Wilko and McMahon, federal rights deserve 
protection, even in arbitration.  There is one other type of award that requires judicial 
correction.  Despite the statements in Hall Street and Concepcion that the FAA 
provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur, the courts must correct awards that 
violate well-defined federal public policy, particularly those that endanger public 
health, safety, or welfare, or condone unlawful acts.  All other awards should not be 
reviewed, on the federal level, for errors of law.  Where an award does not decide a 
federal right or violate federal public policy, the FAA policy favoring efficiency in 
arbitration trumps any need of judicial review for errors of law. 
Part II of this Article discusses Wilko and First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan,27 the Supreme Court decisions, which, perhaps unwittingly, led to the 
                                                          
 
21
 Id. at 585. 
 
22
 See infra Part III.B (cataloguing and analyzing cases interpreting Hall Street).  
 
23
 Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1761 (2010). 
 
24
 Id. at 1768 n.3. 
 
25
 Id. at 1776. 
 
26
 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 
27
 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kapan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
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establishment and confirmation of the manifest disregard standard.  This Part also 
examines the reaction of the lower federal courts to this dubious standard of review. 
Part III analyzes Hall Street, a perplexing decision which provided alternative 
interpretations of what “manifest disregard” might mean.  The unfortunate result of 
Hall Street is that some courts have declared the manifest disregard standard dead 
while others have held that it is still viable. 
Part IV explores the McMahon and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,28 
decisions in which the Supreme Court contradicted its dicta in Wilko and stated that 
errors of law in cases involving federal statutory rights were reviewable.  Part IV 
shows that such review finds support in both the legislative history of the FAA and 
the evolution of arbitration since passage of the Act. 
Part V begins with a discussion of Stolt-Nielsen, observing that the Supreme 
Court, though asserting that it was applying the manifest disregard standard 
arguendo, applied de novo review to nullify a partial award that would have violated 
FAA policy.  Stolt-Nielsen therefore suggested that the Court might be receptive to 
an expanded scope of review under the proper circumstances.  In Concepcion, 
however, the Court seemed to reject this possibility.  Despite Concepcion, Part V 
advocates that awards violating well-defined federal public policy be subject to 
judicial correction at the federal level.  This Part goes on to propose that there should 
be no federal judicial review for awards not determining federal statutory rights or 
violating well-defined federal public policy.   Finally, this Part addresses the 
potential objection that the framework proposed in this Article would reduce the 
efficiency of arbitration. 
The Article concludes with Part VI, which emphasizes the need to balance the 
policies of the FAA to promote the efficiency of arbitration with the policies of other 
federal laws.  The approach proposed in this Article achieves a suitable balance.  The 
Supreme Court has floundered on this issue for nearly sixty years.  The 
jurisprudence of arbitration cannot withstand another sixty.  It is time for Congress 
to set things right.        
II.  MANIFEST DISREGARD: EMERGENCE AND CONFIRMATION 
The Supreme Court, on numerous occasions, has addressed the standard that a 
court should apply when reviewing errors of law made in arbitration awards.  The 
first such case was Wilko v. Swan.29  It is regrettable that the Wilko decision resorted 
to ambiguous dicta, which has spawned confusion persisting to this very day. 
A.  Wilko v. Swan: The Confusion Begins 
Ironically, Wilko did not directly concern the scope of judicial review of 
arbitration awards.  Rather, the issue presented in Wilko was whether anti-fraud 
claims brought under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 could be arbitrated, or 
whether public policy required that such claims be litigated in state or federal 
court.30  The facts of Wilko were straightforward.  A customer claimed that a broker-
dealer induced him to purchase stock by making material misrepresentations and 
                                                          
 
28
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4 (1991) 
 
29
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 
30
 Id. at 430. 
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omitting material information.31  When the customer commenced a federal lawsuit, 
under § 12(2), the broker-dealer moved to stay the action on the grounds that the 
parties had entered into an arbitration agreement.32 
In Wilko, the policies of the Securities Act—to protect investors from securities 
fraud—clashed with the policy of the FAA—to create an environment hospitable to 
arbitration agreements.33  The Supreme Court held that arbitration, though favored in 
other circumstances, was not a suitable means to resolve a § 12(2) fraud claim.34  
Bolstering its decision, the Court noted that arbitrators, who may not be 
knowledgeable on the intricacies of securities law, do not ordinarily write decisions 
or keep transcripts of hearings.35  These practices prevented courts from effectively 
reviewing arbitration awards.36  To protect investors from securities fraud, stronger 
procedural safeguards were required than those embedded in arbitration’s informal 
approach to dispute resolution.37 
The Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the order of the Second Circuit, which 
held the arbitration agreement enforceable.38  The Second Circuit, as part of its 
rationale for holding § 12(2) claims arbitratable, observed that “arbitrators are bound 
to decide in accordance with the provisions of section 12(2).”39  If arbitrators 
committed errors in interpreting the securities laws, such errors would “constitute 
                                                          
 
31
 Id. at 428-29.  
 
32
 Id. at 429.  The broker-dealer moved under § 3 of the FAA, which provides: “If any suit 
or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to 
arbitration, the court . . . shall upon application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action 
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .”  9 
U.S.C. § 3 (2006).   
 
33
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
 
34
 Id.  In addition to questioning the adequacy of arbitration to resolve § 12(2) disputes, 
the Court relied on the interrelationship of two sections of the Securities Act.  Section 14 
provides that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision . . . of this subchapter or of the rules 
and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”  Section 22(a) provides that “[t]he district 
courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial 
courts . . . of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this subchapter.”  The Court concluded that an arbitration agreement constitutes an 
impermissible § 14 waiver of the § 22(a) right to sue in a state or federal district court. Id. at 
434-35.  The Second Circuit had rejected this reasoning, noting that if a party may settle a § 
12(2) claim without violating the § 14 no-waiver provision, the party should be allowed to 
arbitrate such a claim.  U.S. v. Marachowsky, 201 F.2d 5, 11 (7th Cir. 1953).  Years later, the 
Supreme Court, in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989), overruled Wilko and reversed its position on the waiver argument, observing that “[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights of the 
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”  
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).                   
 
35
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 
36
 Id.  
 
37
 Id. at 437.   
 
38
 Id. at 438. 
 
39
 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 440, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).   
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grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act.”40  The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, could not leave this 
point unanswered.  If, as the Second Circuit stated, section 12(2) arbitration awards 
were subject to plenary judicial review for errors of law, the Supreme Court’s 
holding – that arbitration inadequately protects the statutory rights of victimized 
investors – would be undermined.  The Supreme Court’s refutation of the Second 
Circuit’s observation on the scope of judicial review began as follows: 
While it may be true, as the Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of the 
arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities 
Act would “constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 
10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,” that failure would need to be made 
clearly to appear.41    
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court then lapsed into muddled dicta, which has cast the 
issue of the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards into uncertainty for over 
half a century.  The Court stated: “In unrestricted submissions, such as the present 
margin agreements envisage, the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in 
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review 
for error in interpretation.”42 
This statement perplexed the federal courts.  As noted by the Fifth Circuit, “it is 
not surprising that the lower courts initially grappled with the uncertain implications 
of this clause.”43  In San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals 
LTD,44 the Ninth Circuit expressed its dismay more forcefully: 
Frankly, the Supreme Court’s use of the words “manifest disregard” has 
caused us trouble here.  Conceivably the words may have been used to 
indicate that whether an award may be set aside for errors of law would 
be a question of degree.  Thus if the award was based upon a mistaken 
view of the law, but in their assumption of what the law was, the 
arbitrators had not gone too far afield, then, the award would stand; but if 
the error is an egregious one, such as no sensible layman would be guilty 
of, then the award could be set aside.  Such a “degree of error” test would, 
we think, be most difficult to apply.  Results would likely vary from judge 
to judge.  We believe this is not what the court had in mind when it spoke 
of “manifest disregard.”45 
Despite the vagueness of the Wilko dicta, the circuit courts, one by one, recognized 
the manifest disregard standard.46  For example, the Second Circuit, in T.Co Metals 
                                                          
 
40
 Id.  
 
41






 Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2009).   
 
44




 Id. at 801 n.4.   
 
46
 See, e.g., Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 
2008) (stating that “factual or legal error, no matter how gross, is insufficient to support 
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LLC v. Dempsey Pipe and Supply, Inc.,47 noted that the manifest disregard of the law 
standard is not met when the arbitrator makes a simple legal error.48  The doctrine 
applies only when three elements are met.49  First, the law applicable to the issue 
under decision must be clear.50  Second, the arbitrator must have improperly applied 
the law and the error must have affected the outcome of the case.51  Third, the 
arbitrator must have known the applicable law and intentionally ignored it.52  
Focusing on the third element of the Second Circuit’s definition, the Tenth Circuit 
defined “manifest disregard” more succinctly.  The doctrine applies when the 
arbitrators “knew the law and explicitly disregarded it.”53  This is the predominant 
definition of the manifest disregard standard.54 
                                                          
overturning an arbitration award.”); Collins v. D.R. Horton., Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 
2007) (quoting San Martine De Navegacion for the proposition that a court may vacate an 
award under the manifest disregard standard only when the arbitrator knew the law and 
intentionally ignored it); Three S Delaware Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 
527 (4th Cir. 2007) (confirming that the Fourth Circuit recognizes the manifest disregard 
standard as arising from “common law”); McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 
87, 93 (1st Cir. 2006) (asserting that the manifest disregard standard requires that the 
arbitrator “willfully” decided not to apply governing law); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. 
Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005) (defining “manifest disregard” 
to mean more than an error of law but rather an error resulting from an arbitrator’s “explicit” 
refusal to apply controlling law); Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that to manifestly disregard the law the arbitrator must “clearly identify” governing law and 
ignore it); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (characterizing the 
manifest disregard standard as a product of “common law”); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 
365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the result of judicial application of the “exceedingly 
narrow” manifest disregard standard “is generally to affirm easily the arbitration award”); 
Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(describing “manifest disregard” as “willfull inattentiveness to governing law”); Scott v. 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the manifest 
disregard standard as a nonstatutory ground of review); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 
F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the manifest disregard standard must adapt 
to varying circumstances, the scope of the standard increasing from limited review to plenary 
review for errors of law when the arbitrators decide claims alleging the denial of rights 
conferred by federal statutes); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 
418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law where an 
award lacks “any line of argument that is legally plausible”).   
 
47
 T.Co Metals LLC v. Dempsey Pipe and Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 
48












 Id.    
 
53
 Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App’x. 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hollern v. 
Wachovia Secs., Inc., 458 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006)).  See also Frazier v. CitiFinancial 
Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that manifest disregard of the law means 
that the arbitrator deliberately ignored controlling law). 
 
54
 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (setting forth the prevalent definition of the 
manifest disregard standard). 
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Because of the vagueness of the phrase “manifest disregard of the law,” not all 
circuits have defined the term identically.  In Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith 
v. Jaros,55 for example, the Sixth Circuit stated, “If a court can find any line of 
argument that is legally plausible and supports the award then it must be confirmed.  
Only where no judge or groups of judges could conceivably come to the same 
determination as the arbitrators must the award be set aside.”56  Unlike the Second 
Circuit’s standard, which requires deliberate disregard of controlling law, the Sixth 
Circuit in Jaros seems to adopt a less deferential “clearly erroneous” standard. 
In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon,57 the Fifth Circuit expressed a third 
variation of what “manifest disregard” might mean.  The Fifth Circuit held that for a 
legal error to rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law it “must have been 
obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person 
qualified to serve as an arbitrator.”58  This standard is even more confounding than 
the ones adopted by the Second and Sixth Circuits.  There is no GRE for arbitrators.  
Some are lawyers who understand the legal principles governing the matter 
presented for arbitration.  Others are chosen as arbitrators because they have 
experience with and expertise in the trade practices relevant to the case.  Still others 
are not conversant or even familiar with the applicable law or with relevant trade 
practices.  One can only guess at how a judge might determine the acumen of the 
“average” person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.  One can only puzzle at why a 
standard of judicial review should depend on what such a hypothetical person can 
“instantly perceive.” 
 
B.  First Option v. Kaplan: Dubious Confirmation 
 
It was not until 1995, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,59 that the 
Supreme Court again mentioned the manifest disregard standard.  Manuel and Carol 
Kaplan and their wholly-owned investment company, MKI Investments, incurred 
losses in the stock market crash of 1987 and later in 1989.60  Their clearing firm, 
First Options of Chicago (“First Options”), liquidated certain MKI assets and 
demanded that the Kaplans pay the deficiency.61  When the Kaplans refused, First 
Options initiated an arbitration proceeding under the auspices of the Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange.62  MKI accepted the propriety of arbitration, but the Kaplans, who 
had not personally signed an arbitration agreement, denied the authority of the 
arbitration panel to hear their case.63  The panel decided that it had such authority 
                                                          
 
55
 Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 
56
 Id. at 421. 
 
57
 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
58
 Id. at 354. 
 
59
 First Options of Chicago, Inc v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 
60






 Id.  
 
63
 Id. at 941. 
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and ultimately ruled in favor of First Options on the merits of the dispute.64  The 
district court confirmed the award, but the Third Circuit vacated it, holding that the 
dispute was not arbitrable.65 
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the courts or the 
arbitrators had the authority to determine the arbitrability of the dispute between 
First Options and the Kaplans.66  In explaining the practical importance of the issue, 
the Court commented on the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards.  
If the arbitrators had the authority to decide arbitrability, their decision would be 
nearly immune to judicial oversight. 67  To prove its point, the Court cited Wilko, 
noting parenthetically and without elaboration that “parties [are] bound by 
arbitrator’s decision not in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.”68  This casual reference 
to Wilko did nothing to clarify the meaning of “manifest disregard” of the law.  It 
did, however, confirm that the Supreme Court viewed manifest disregard of the law 
as a viable standard. 
III.  HALL STREET V. MATTEL: CONFUSION CONFIRMED 
In Hall Street Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,69 the Supreme Court discussed the 
ambiguities in Wilko’s comments on the scope of judicial review of arbitration 
awards.  As if baffled by a parchment of ancient hieroglyphics, the Court could not 
decipher what the curious dicta in Wilko meant. 
A.  The Hall Street Case 
Hall Street involved a landlord-tenant dispute.  Hall Street leased a property to 
Mattel, which agreed, in a written lease, to indemnify Hall Street for costs arising 
from violations of environmental laws committed by Mattel or its predecessor-
tenants.70  After the discovery of pollutants discharged at the site by Mattel’s 
predecessors, Mattel signed a consent order to clean up the site, and it terminated the 
lease.71  Hall Street asserted its right to indemnification, a claim which Mattel 






 Id.  
 
66
 Emphasizing that arbitration is “simply a matter of contract,” Justice Breyer, writing for 
a unanimous Court, stated that the agreement itself will determine the resolution of the 
arbitrability issue.  Id. at 943.  Justice Breyer cautioned, however, that arbitrators may 
determine the issue of arbitrability only if the evidence of such an agreement is clear and 
unmistakable.  Id. at 944.  Because First Options could not meet this standard, Justice Breyer 
concluded that the issue of arbitrability in this case was for the court, rather than the 
arbitrators, to decide.  Id. at 947. 
 
67
 Id. at 942. 
 
68
 Id.  The court also noted that, under § 10 of the FAA, a court may vacate an award 
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means or if the arbitrator exceeded his powers.  Id. 
 
69
 Hall Street Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 
70
 Id. at 579. 
 
71
 Id.  Tests of the property’s well water, conducted in 1998, indicated high levels of 
trichloroethylene.  After the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality found additional 
contamination, Mattel stopped using the well, and, along with one of its predecessors, signed 
the consent decree in which it undertook to clean up the site.  Id. 
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contested.72  The parties entered into an agreement to submit this dispute to 
arbitration.73  The arbitration agreement provided: “The [District] Court shall vacate, 
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of fact are not 
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law 
are erroneous.”74 
The arbitrator decided for Mattel, ruling the indemnification provision 
inapplicable to the violation committed by Mattel’s predecessors.75  The district 
court granted Hall Street’s motion to vacate the award, 76 invoking the parties’ 
agreement ostensibly authorizing the court to vacate an award based on an erroneous 
conclusion of law.77  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, 
on the ground that the arbitration agreement’s judicial review provision was 
unenforceable.78  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case, instructing the 
district court to confirm the original arbitration award.79 
                                                          
 
72
 Id.  Hall Street filed a summons and complaint in federal district court, disputing 
Mattel’s right to terminate the lease and seeking to enforce the indemnification clause.  Mattel 
prevailed on the termination issue.  The parties then attempted to mediate the indemnification 
claim, but after their efforts at mediation proved unsuccessful, they agreed to submit the 
dispute to arbitration.  The court approved the arbitration agreement and entered an order 









 Id. at 580.  The arbitrator noted that the lease provision required Mattel to indemnify 
Hall Street for violations of federal, state, and local environmental law.  The pollutants found 
on the leased premises violated the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act.  Characterizing this 
Act as a health law, rather than an environmental law, the arbitrator found the indemnification 






 Id.  The district court held that the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act was an 
environmental law and remanded the matter to the arbitrator.  On remand, the arbitrator 
decided for Hall Street.  Both parties moved in the district court to modify the arbitrator’s 
decision.  The district court, again applying a plenary standard of review as stipulated by the 
parties, corrected the arbitrator’s calculation of interest and otherwise confirmed.  Id. 
 
78
 Id. at 581.  The district court granted Hall Street’s motion to vacate upholding the 
parties contract to expand the scope of judicial review to include errors of law, relying on 
LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997) .  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Mattel holding that according to 
Kyocera, the Ninth Circuit’s recent en banc decision, “the terms of the arbitration agreement 
controlling the mode of judicial review are unenforceable and severable.”  Hall Street Assocs., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 272, 272-73 (2004) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. 
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also 
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that parties may 
not contractually expand the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards); cf. Syncor Int’l 
Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997), 1997 WL 45245 *6 (reaching the same 
conclusion in an unpublished opinion).  But see Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. 
Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding contractual expansion of arbitrator’s scope 
of review); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 
2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Gateway 
Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995); cf. UHC Mgt. Co. v. 
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1.  The Supreme Court Decision: Obfuscation 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.80  The issue before the Court in Hall 
Street was whether the parties to an arbitration agreement could validly agree to 
expand the grounds prescribed in § 10 and § 11 of the FAA for vacating or 
correcting an arbitration award.81  Hall Street argued that the agreement to expand 
judicial review was valid, relying on the proposition that the FAA is “motivated, first 
and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties 
ha[ve] entered.”82  According to Hall Street, the policy favoring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements implied that courts should enforce arbitration agreements to 
expand judicial review.83  The Court rejected this argument.84 While conceding that 
the FAA grants the parties wide latitude in the selection of arbitrators, choice of law, 
and other features of the process, the Court read the text of the statute to limit the 
scope of review.85  The Court relied on two textual arguments.  First, it noted that all 
the grounds for vacatur prescribed in the FAA such as “corruption,” “fraud,” and 
“evident partiality,” address “egregious” arbitral improprieties different in kind from 
mere errors of law.86  Second, the Court cited § 9 of the FAA, which provides that a 
court “must” confirm an award “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected 
as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”87  The mandatory wording of § 9 
left no room for disagreement: the statutory grounds enumerated in § 10 and § 11 of 
the FAA are exclusive.88 
                                                          
Computer Sciences Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1998) (expressing in dicta that 
parties may contractually expand the scope of review). 
 
79
 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).  The district court 






 Id. at 578. 
 
82






 Id. at 586.  See Eric S. Chafetz, An Opportunity Lost: The Supreme Court’s Failure to 
Recognize the Implications of Its Holding in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., at 
14 (March 2009), available at http://bepress.com/eric_chafetz/2 (stating that, although Hall 
Street may have been correctly decided on the grounds of statutory interpretation, the 
Supreme Court underplayed the role of party intent). 
 
85






 Id. at 587.   
 
88
 Id. at 586.  The Hall Street Court did not expressly rule whether parties to an arbitration 
agreement could expand review by limiting the decisional powers of the arbitrators rather than 
on expanding the review powers of the courts.  Thus, the parties might seek to expand the 
scope of review by agreeing that the arbitrators must correctly apply a particular law or the 
law of a particular state and that the arbitrators exceed their powers by failing to apply such 
law correctly.  This strategic rewording of an arbitration clause would arguably reposition 
legal errors of arbitrators within the range of § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, which provides review 
when the arbitrators exceeded their powers.  However, the chance that the Supreme Court, or 
other courts following Hall Street, would uphold clauses using this backdoor strategy seems 
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remote.  Preliminarily, it should be noted that in Hall Street, the parties arbitrated the 
application of an indemnification clause to the costs of cleaning up toxic waste.  Neither party 
asked the arbitrators to decide its rights under federal statutes such as the federal securities 
laws or the federal civil rights laws.  If the Court were presented with such a federal rights 
issue, the analysis might proceed differently because of the exigencies of public policies 
expressed in federal law.  In the context of Hall Street, however, the Court emphasized that 
the FAA does not allow “general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.”  Id. at 585.  It would 
seem that any contractual attempt to override this limitation would conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s view of FAA policy.  Although the Hall Street Court did not decide the enforceability 
of such clauses, one could argue persuasively that directing the courts to correct all legal 
errors, as Hall Street Associates and Mattel attempted to do, is functionally and therefore 
legally equivalent to providing contractually that any legal error by the arbitrators exceeds 
their authority and incidentally triggers judicial review.  Such a deft turn of phrase is likely to 
invoke charges of putting form over substance and it is unlikely to win the blessing of the 
Supreme Court.  Furthermore, Hall Street mentioned circumstances, including state statutory 
and common law and the authority of federal courts to manage pending cases, where an award 
might be subject to review broader than that permitted under the FAA.  See id. at 576, 590-92.  
It is telling that the Supreme Court did not list among these circumstances any contractual 
maneuvers that might achieve the same result.  Several scholars have considered the issue as 
to whether wording arbitration clauses to place legal errors beyond the powers of the 
arbitrators would circumvent Hall Street.  Professor Stipanowich doubts whether the Supreme 
Court would uphold such clauses.  He states:  
Although Hall Street came down strongly against extra-statutory bases for vacatur, 
might what the Second Circuit terms “judicial gloss” permit parties to give form and 
content to the boundaries of arbitrators’ authority and what constitutes “exceeding 
their powers” under § 10(a)(4)?  Might, for example parties trigger judicial review 
of errors of law by describing a failure to faithfully observe and apply particular law 
as “in excess of the arbitrator’s powers.”  While it is highly doubtful that the Stolt-
Nielsen majority actively contemplated, or relishes, the prospect, there is no doubt 
that hopeful attorneys will seize on the wisp of a possibility of wedging a foot in the 
door of vacatur. 
Thomas Stipanowich, Revelations and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape American Arbitration, 
Pepperdine University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Studies Series, Paper No. 
2011/11, at 15 (Apr. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1757258.  Professor 
Drahozal believes that such a clause is not an evasion of Hall Street, but it is rather an 
effective use of § 10(a)(4).  He therefore concludes that such clauses should be enforceable, 
though he acknowledges that the weight of post-Hall Street judicial authority contradicts him.  
Christopher R. Drahozal, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: Contracting Around Hall 
Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 916 (2010).  See Francis v. Landstar Sys. Holdings, 
Inc., No. 3:09-cv-238-J-32JRK, 2009 WL 4350250, *6, 7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009) (rejecting 
the argument that, where an arbitration agreement limited the arbitrator’s authority to applying 
controlling law correctly, an arbitrator who committed an error of law exceeded her authority 
and her award was therefore subject to vacatur); Wood v. PennTex Resources, LP, No. H-06-
2198, 2008 WL 2609319, *8 (June 27, 2008) (interpreting Hall Street to invalidate provision 
in arbitration agreement stating that any clearly erroneous factual determination by the 
arbitrators exceeds their powers and is therefore not subject to confirmation) .  But see Cable 
Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 596 (Cal. 2008) (upholding, under the 
California Arbitration Act, the enforceability of an arbitration provision stating that arbitrators  
exceed their power by committing legal error and that the courts are empowered to review 
such errors).  See generally Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in 
Hall Street Associates L.L.V. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1187, 1195-96 (2009) (noting that after Hall Street sophisticated parties began to draft 
clauses that deny arbitrators the power to make errors of law and direct courts to vacate 
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Contesting this proposition, Hall Street relied on the Wilko decision.  Hall Street 
contended that, by establishing the manifest disregard standard, Wilko had 
recognized the acceptability of expanded judicial review of arbitration awards.89  
The Court rejected this argument for several reasons.  Refusing to confirm that Wilko 
established the manifest disregard standard, the Court stressed that, even if Wilko 
had done so, “manifest disregard” was judicially rather than contractually created.90  
The judicial power to expand the grounds of review did not imply an analogous 
contractual right.91  Second, the Supreme Court observed that Hall Street was 
seeking to enforce a provision authorizing plenary judicial review for errors of law, 
whereas Wilko recognized, at the very most, a standard of review only for egregious 
errors.92 
The Supreme Court also took note of the “vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing,” 
speculating about the meaning of the term “manifest disregard:” 
Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new ground 
for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, 
rather than adding to them. . . . Or, as some courts have thought, 
“manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 
10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were 
“guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers.”93 
Although the Supreme Court speculated that perhaps “the term ‘manifest disregard’ 
was meant to name a ground for review,”94 the Court did not suggest what that 
ground might be.  The Court’s omission is striking.  This amorphous standard is the 
John Doe of judicial review.  It is a term that the Supreme Court coined without 
definition or content, and yet it is a doctrine that the circuits invested with 
significance and that many circuits continue to apply.   
2.  Other Possible Interpretations of the Wilko Dicta  
There are possibilities beyond those adopted by the circuit courts that one might 
reasonably extract from the ambiguous Wilko dicta.  At this point, it might be 
instructive to revisit that ambiguous language.  The Supreme Court stated that, to be 
reversible, a legal error committed by an arbitrator “would need to be made clearly 
to appear.”95  The Court continued that “interpretations of the law by the arbitrators 
in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial 
review for error in interpretation.”96  Although the term “manifest disregard” would 
                                                          
awards with such errors, and suggesting that this practice complies with Hall Street and fits 
into § 10 of the FAA).                                 
 
89
 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584. 
 
90
 Id. at 585. 
 
91












 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953).   
 
96
 Id. at 436-37.   
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seem not to apply to an ordinary error of law, the term might mean that the arbitrator 
demonstrably failed to apply controlling law, whether the error was intentional or 
not.  Under this definition, “manifest” would mean “demonstrable.”  Many errors 
made by arbitrators are not demonstrable because arbitrators do not ordinarily 
provide written opinions to support their awards.97  This lack of transparency was 
prevalent when the Supreme Court decided Wilko,98 so it is quite possible that the 
Wilko Court meant “demonstrable” when it used the word “manifest.”  Defining 
“manifest” in this way also jibes with the Court’s statement that errors must “be 
made clearly to appear.”99  A judge should not guess at the grounds for an 
arbitrator’s decision and vacate that decision without a clear indication of its legal 
basis.  “Disregard of the law,” under this definition, would mean a failure to apply 
the law rather than a mistake in applying it.  Such a failure might well be described 
as “disregard.” 
There is yet another and less restrictive interpretation that would provide a 
reasonable solution to the linguistic mystery.  Perhaps an arbitrator manifestly 
disregards the law when he or she demonstrably (again defining “manifestly” as 
“demonstrably”) commits an error of law on a point not subject to interpretation, that 
is, on a point of well-settled law.  This definition of manifest disregard of the law fits 
the Supreme Court’s directive in Wilko that “interpretations of the law” “are not 
subject, in the federal court, to judicial review . . . .”100 
Defining “manifest disregard” is a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey exercise.  It is 
unfortunate that controversy surrounds both the meaning and viability of such an 
important legal doctrine.101  Perhaps when the Supreme Court introduced the term, it 
did not contemplate that the circuit courts would elevate dicta to law, let alone to the 
principal doctrine used to decide motions to vacate arbitration awards.  The time is 
long overdue when the high Court should announce whether manifest disregard is a 
living doctrine or a mere fancy of the judicial imagination.  In Hall Street, the Court 
chose to keep the doctrine dangling on a tightrope, by holding that, although the 
FAA provides the exclusive grounds for review, § 10 might imply the manifest 
disregard standard.  The Court’s equivocation has instigated another round of 
confusion among the federal courts. 
                                                          
 
97
 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that arbitrators do not ordinarily 
provide written explanations for their decisions). 
 
98
 In a dissenting opinion to the Second Circuit’s decision in Wilko, Judge Clark wrote: 
“[T]he arbitrators will act according to their business background and there will be no way – 
unless they volunteer foolish explanations in their decision – of checking what they do.”  
Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 446 (1953) (Clark, J., dissenting).    
 
99
 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. 
 
100
 Id. at 436-37. 
 
101
 See Zachary L. Gould, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d 
Cir. 2008), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1109, 1109 (2010) (noting that, after Hall Street, 
the federal circuit courts disagree “not only on the manifest disregard doctrine’s scope but also 
on its very existence.”). 
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B.  The Divided Reaction to Hall Street 
The circuit courts are divided on whether Hall Street abolished the manifest 
disregard standard.102  A circuit’s response to Hall Street has often depended on 
                                                          
 
102
 Some circuit courts, in the wake of Hall Street, continue to recognize the manifest 
disregard standard as a valid ground for vacating awards.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Wells Fargo 
Home Mortg., Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n.11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reading the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen as expressing “some doubt” on whether the manifest disregard 
standard survived Hall Street, but concluding that, in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Comedy Club, “in this Circuit the ‘manifest disregard’ standard has survived Hall Street 
intact, and so we are bound to apply it”) (citing Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 
553 F.3d 1277, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 2010)); T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 
592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the Second Circuit’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen 
that the manifest disregard standard is a judicial gloss on the grounds for vacatur specified in § 
10 of the FAA, and that the manifest disregard standard therefore survives Hall Street) (citing 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2008)); Comedy 
Club, 553 F.3d at 1291 (adhering to the manifest disregard standard post-Hall Street because 
the standard “is a shorthand for a statutory ground under the FAA, specifically 9 U.S.C. § 
10(a)(4), which states that the court may vacate where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 Fed. App’x 415, 
419 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding, in an unpublished decision, that the manifest disregard standard, 
as a “judicially-invoked” ground for vacatur, continues to be viable after Hall Street because 
the Supreme Court only rejected contractual expansion of the grounds in §§ 10 and 11 of the 
FAA and did not address judicial expansion of those grounds).  Other circuit courts have held 
that Hall Street’s statutory interpretation that the grounds for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive 
abolished the manifest disregard standard.  See Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc., Turner, 614 F.3d 
485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Hall Street for the proposition that the grounds for vacatur 
prescribed in § 10 are exclusive, and holding that “[a]ppellants’ claims, including the claim 
that the arbitrator disregarded the law, are not included among those specifically enumerated 
in § 10 and are therefore not cognizable”); Frazier v. Citifinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 
1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that, since the manifest disregard standard was judicially 
created, Hall Street abolished it by ruling that the grounds for vacatur enumerated in §§ 10 
and 11 of the FAA are exclusive); Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“In the light of the Supreme Court’s clear language that, under the FAA, the 
statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an 
independent ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”).  Still other 
circuit courts have commented on the issue without deciding whether Hall Street invalidated 
the manifest disregard standard.  See Hicks v. The Cadle Co., 355 Fed. App’x 186, 197 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (viewing the manifest disregard standard as judicially created, but declining to 
decide whether Hall Street abolished it because the defendants failed to meet the manifest 
disregard standard in their motion to vacate the award); Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel 
Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that Hall Street invalidated the 
manifest disregard standard, but declining to follow it because the case was brought under 
Puerto Rican law, not the FAA); UMass Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union, 527 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that courts have inherent 
powers, outside of § 10, to vacate awards).   In Grain v. Trinity Health, Mercy Health Servs. 
Inc., the Sixth Circuit noted that it had previously characterized the manifest disregard 
standard as “judicially created.”  551 F.3d 374, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros Inc., 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995)), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 96 (2009).  Although it declined to rule on the continued viability of the manifest disregard 
standard, it recognized, contrary to its previous decision in Coffee Beanery, that “Hall Street’s 
reference to the ‘exclusive’ statutory grounds for obtaining relief casts some doubt on the 
continuing vitality of that theory.”   Grain, 551 F.3d at 380. 
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whether the circuit viewed the manifest disregard standard as statutory or 
nonstatutory.103  As shown below, there have been three positions taken among those 
circuits that have reached definitive decisions.     
1.  Manifest Disregard as a Nonstatutory Ground of Review   
In Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon,104 the Fifth Circuit held that Hall 
Street abolished the manifest disregard standard.105 Although the Fifth Circuit, prior 
to the Bacon case, had adopted the manifest disregard standard as a nonstatutory 
ground of review, it recognized the dubious origins of the doctrine: 
Our circuit did not accept manifest disregard of the law as a nonstatutory 
ground for vacatur with immediate confidence and certainty. . . . Indeed, 
manifest disregard of the law does not have a compelling origin as a 
ground for vacatur.  Its modest debut occurs in a vague phrase found in 
Wilko v. Swan . . . .106 
The Fifth Circuit noted that Hall Street held that the grounds for vacatur prescribed 
in the FAA are exclusive.107  Because the Fifth Circuit had classified manifest 
disregard as a nonstatutory ground, it concluded that manifest disregard of the law 
was no longer a basis to vacate arbitration awards.108 
Coffee Beanery Ltd. v. WW L.L.C,109 an unpublished decision of the Sixth 
Circuit, conflicts with Bacon.110  Although conceding that Hall Street “significantly 
reduced” the viability of the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of arbitration, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded nonetheless that Hall Street did not eliminate them.111  To exempt 
the manifest disregard standard from Hall Street’s pronouncement that the grounds 
for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive, the Sixth Circuit stressed that Hall Street 
rejected contractual rather than judicial expansion of the scope of review.112  
                                                          
 
103
 Compare Johnson, 635 F.3d at 401, 415 n. 11 (confirming the Ninth Circuit’s 
recognition of the manifest disregard standard after Hall Street and Stolt-Nielsen because 
manifest disregard is a “shorthand” for § 10(a)(4) of the FAA) and T.Co Metals, 592 F.3d at 
339 (reaffirming the Second Circuit’s position that the manifest disregard standard is a 
“judicial gloss” on the grounds for vacatur specified in § 10 of the FAA) with Medicine 
Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 489 (holding that Hall Street abolished manifest disregard, which was a 
nonstatutory ground for vacatur) and Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1324 (ruling that, since the manifest 
disregard standard was judicially created, Hall Street abolished it). 
 
104
 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).  
 
105
 Id. at 358. 
 
106
 Id. at 354.  See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(recognizing the manifest disregard standard as a nonstatutory ground of review in light of the 
First Options decision). 
 
107
 Citigroup, 562 F.3d at 355. 
 
108
 Id.  
 
109
 Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 F. App’x. 415 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 
110
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Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit observed that “manifest disregard”—a narrow 
standard of review—comported with Hall Street’s disapproval of general review for 
arbitration awards.113  The Sixth Circuit seized upon Hall Street’s suggestion that the 
vague language in Wilko might have “meant to name a new ground for review” 
outside the grounds expressed in §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.114  Given that all the 
circuits had adopted the manifest disregard standard before the Hall Street decision, 
the Sixth Circuit concluded that “it would be imprudent to cease employing such a 
universally recognized principle.”115              
2.  Manifest Disregard as a Statutory Ground of Review 
In Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates,116 the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether the manifest disregard standard, which it had long recognized as a statutory 
ground for review, survived Hall Street.117  The court noted that it had held 
previously that the manifest disregard standard is a “shorthand” for § 10(a)(4) of the 
FAA, the subsection authorizing the vacatur for awards “where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers.”118  The Hall Street decision, the Ninth Circuit observed, had 
not decided whether § 10(a)(4) of the FAA implied the manifest disregard standard 
of review.119  Nevertheless, Hall Street had listed this possibility among several 
viable interpretations of Wilko’s seminal language, which gave birth to the standard.  






 Id. at 419 (quoting Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008)).  
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Hall Street is implausible.  The court’s principal point 
was that Hall Street speculated that Wilko might have meant the term “‘manifest disregard’ to 
name a new ground for review.”  Coffee Beanery, 300 Fed. App’x at 419 (6th Cir. 2008).  The 
Supreme Court’s speculation about what Wilko might have meant does not imply that the 
Court would agree with Wilko if Wilko intended to create a ground for review not prescribed 
in the FAA.  Hall Street was unequivocal that the grounds specified in §§ 10 and 11 are 
exclusive.  If dicta in Wilko meant to suggest that manifest disregard of the law was a creature 
of judicial invention rather than one of statutory construction, the dicta in Wilko would violate 
the holding of Hall Street.  The Wilko dicta would therefore not be entitled to any weight. 
 
115
 Coffee Beanery, 300 Fed.Appx. at 419. 
 
116
 Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 
117
 Id. at 1290; see also Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n. 
11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming that in the Ninth Circuit the manifest disregard standard has 
survived Hall Street). 
 
118
 Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade 
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc) (holding that arbitrators exceed their 
powers when their decisions are completely irrational or when the arbitrators manifestly 
disregard the law)).  Accord Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.2d 85, 95 
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that FAA § 10(a)(4) implies the manifest disregard standard because it 
includes, as a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards, a finding that the arbitrators 
“exceeded their powers”). 
 
119
 Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290. 
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Since established Ninth Circuit precedent was not “clearly irreconcilable”120 with 
Hall Street, the Ninth Circuit held the manifest disregard standard viable.121 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S LAPSE INTO SELF-CONTRADICTION 
It is stunning that between Wilko, a 1953 decision arguably establishing the 
manifest disregard standard, and First Options, a 1995 decision arguably confirming 
the viability of that standard, the Supreme Court issued two opinions declaring that 
certain arbitral awards are subject to plenary review for errors of law.  The decisions 
recognizing plenary review cannot be reconciled with the manifest disregard 
standard.  The clash between the two standards is—manifest.  To understand why the 
Supreme Court lapsed into self-contradiction, one must trace the evolution of 
arbitration policy. 
A.  Judicial Hostility Toward Arbitration Agreements 
Before passage of the FAA, the widespread perception among businesspersons 
and legislators was that American common law courts, as a rule, refused to enforce 
arbitration agreements.122  Though perhaps exaggerated,123 the perception of judicial 
hostility toward arbitration had support in case law.124  The courts’ rationale for this 
                                                          
 
120
 Id. at 1290 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 




 Id. at 1290; accord Johnson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 635 F.3d 401, 415 n. 
11 (9th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming that in the Ninth Circuit the manifest disregard standard has 
survived Hall Street). 
 
122
 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, To Validate Certain Agreements for Arbitration, at 1-2 (1924) 
(hereinafter “House Report 1924”) (“The need for the new law arises from an anachronism of 
our American law.  Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their 
jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the 
courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction.  This jealousy survived so long a period 
that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with 
it by the American courts.”); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:  Hearings on 
H.R. 646 and S. 1005 before the Joint Committee of Subcommittees on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong., at 14 (1924) (hereinafter “Hearings 1924”) (statement of Julius Henry Cohen) (“The 
difficulty is that men do enter into such [arbitration] agreements and then afterwards repudiate 
the agreement, and the difficulty has been that for over 300 years…the courts have said that 
that kind of an agreement was one that was revocable at any time.  You go in and watch the 
expression on the face of your arbitrator and you have a ‘hunch’ that he is against you, and 
you withdraw and say, ‘I don’t believe in arbitration anymore.’”)    
 
123
 See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the 
Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 (2009) (commenting that, although 
some English courts invoked the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine to thwart arbitration, English 
courts generally enforced arbitration agreements); Paul L. Sayre, The Development of 
Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 603-04 (1928) (expressing doubt that English 
courts were hostile to arbitration, since the prevalent practice was to secure damages for 
breach of the arbitration agreement through a bond); see, e.g., Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 
597 (1609) (requiring a party who had posted a bond to pay damages for breaching an 
arbitration agreement).  
 
124
 See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (declaring that “[a] man may not 
barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights,” and that “agreements in advance 
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hostility – the ouster of jurisdiction doctrine – originated in eighteenth century 
English common law.125  Protective of their power to decide cases, English courts 
sometimes voiced suspicion about the adequacy of the arbitral process to protect the 
rights of parties.126  In Scott v. Avery,127 for example, Baron Martin commented that 
“[u]pon the award being made, unless the arbitrators have been guilty of fraud, the 
courts have no power to inquire whether the arbitrators have awarded rightly or 
wrongly, according to law or against it.”128  The ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine 
migrated to the United States where many criticized the doctrine for thwarting 
arbitration.129   
Congress passed the FAA to end the judiciary’s resistance to enforcing 
arbitration agreements.130  Section § 2 of the FAA achieves this goal by providing 
that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable, and irrevocable.”131  Yet, after 
passage of the FAA, Wilko refused to allow the arbitration of § 12(2) securities fraud 
claims.132  The Supreme Court’s distrust of arbitration was reminiscent of the 
hostility expressed by English courts when invoking the ouster-of-jurisdiction 
doctrine.    
                                                          
to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”); Leo Kanowitz, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 239, 252 (1987) (“In the past, although courts generally enforced arbitrators’ 




 See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746) (holding that “the agreement of the parties 
cannot oust this court”). See generally Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: 
Unconscionability in the Securities Industry, 78 B.U.L. REV. 255, 261-63 (providing a history 
and analysis of English cases espousing the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine). 
 
126
 Scott v. Avery, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 5 S.C.(H.L.) 811, 841 (1856) (opinion by Coleridge, 
J.) (“The courts will not enforce or sanction an agreement which deprives the subject of that 
recourse to their jurisdiction, which has been considered a right inalienable even by the 
concurrent will of the parties.”)   
 
127
 Id.  
 
128
 Id. at 829 (opinion of Martin, J.). 
 
129
 See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) 
(remarking that Congress enacted the FAA to overcome the judiciary’s refusal to enforce 
arbitration agreements) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 
(1985)); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 
1942) (mocking the “hypnotic effect” of the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); United States 
Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrol. Co., 222 F. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing 
the courts for applying the ouster-of-jurisdiction doctrine); House Report 1924, supra note 
122, at 2 (“If one party is recalcitrant he can no longer escape his agreement, [and] [a]t the 
same time the party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is not subject to the delay 
and cost of litigation”).  
 
130
 See, e.g., Allied Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (noting that 
the purpose of the FAA is to put arbitration agreements “upon the same footing as other 
contracts”) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 474).     
 
131
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  
 
132
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
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B.  A Change of Policy  
After Wilko, the Supreme Court began to rethink its distrust of arbitration until 
the Court changed its viewpoint and arbitration had the Court’s unqualified support.  
In Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Constr. Corp.133 the Court announced that “[s]ection 2 
is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.”134  Recognizing this policy, the Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. 
Byrd135 observed that “[t]he prominent concern of Congress in passing the Act was 
to enforce private arbitration agreements . . . [which] requires that we rigorously 
enforce agreements to arbitrate.”136  Confirming this policy shift, a series of 
decisions declared virtually all federal statutory claims arbitrable.  The Court applied 
its pro-arbitration policy to allow the arbitration of federal claims brought under anti-
trust law, securities law, anti-racketeering law, and civil rights law.137  
These decisions required the Court to address the standard of judicial review of 
awards because Wilko’s refusal to allow the arbitration of § 12(2) rested largely on 
the Court’s concern over inadequate review.138  The Supreme Court had two choices.  
It could either renounce its concern that arbitrators might commit legal error that 
would not be subject to judicial correction, or it could adopt a broader standard of 
judicial review to safeguard the rights of those submitting federal claims to 
arbitrators.  The Court followed the second alternative, but only by resorting to more 
dicta, which regrettably has not supplanted the entrenched dicta of Wilko.139 
1.  McMahon and Gilmer: The Shift Toward Expanded Review 
The Supreme Court decided Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon140 in 
1987, over three decades after Wilko.  The McMahons had a brokerage account at 
Shearson, which contained a standard arbitration agreement.141  Alleging securities 
fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the McMahons sued Shearson 
                                                          
 
133
 Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1982). 
 
134
 Id. at 24. 
 
135
 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).   
 
136
 Id. at 221.  See Maureen A. Weston, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Other 
Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 929, 930 (2010) (commenting that the Supreme Court, over the past 30 years, 




 See Part IV.B.1 (discussing Supreme Court cases that expanded the arbitrability of 
federal statutory claims). 
 
138
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953).  
 
139




 Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 
141
 Id. at 222-23. 
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and their account representative in federal court.142 The defendants moved to compel 
arbitration.143   
The Court was dismissive of Wilko’s distrust of arbitration.144 It had already 
upheld the arbitrability of antitrust claims145 and § 10(b) securities fraud claim in an 
international context, 146 and it seemed eager to extend this rule to § 10(b) claims 
generally.147  The Court, however, was obliged to reconcile the arbitrability of § 
10(b) securities fraud claims with Wilko’s objection to that the scope of judicial 
review is insufficient to protect the rights of victims of securities fraud.148  
Upholding arbitrability while reaffirming ineffectual judicial review would have 
been untenable.  The Court resolved this problem by issuing bold dicta that 
contradicted its notorious dicta in Wilko.  The Court declared: “[W]e have indicated 
that there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law; 
although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is 
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”149  
Reviewing awards for errors of law is far broader than the standard expressed in 
Wilko, which forecloses review for an arbitrator’s “error in interpretation.”150  
Four years after McMahon, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,151 the 
Court held claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
arbitrable.152  Gilmer, age 62, was a manager of financial services for 
Interstate/Johnson Lane.153  As a condition of his employment, he signed an 
arbitration agreement.154  When Interstate terminated his employment, he brought an 
action in federal district court, alleging age discrimination.155  Interstate moved to 
compel arbitration.156  Gilmer argued that “judicial review of arbitration decisions is 









 Id. at 233. 
 
145
 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974) (holding arbitrable a 
securities claim brought by a Delaware corporation against a German national).      
 
146
 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) 
(holding that a Sherman Act antitrust claim alleged by a Puerto Rico corporation against a 
Japanese and a Swiss corporation was arbitrable).  
 
147
 Shearson/American Express Inc v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220, 232-33 (1987). 
 
148
 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). 
 
149
 Shearson/American Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 232. 
 
150
 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37. 
 
151
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 
152









 Id. at 23-24. 
 
156
 Id. at 24. 
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too limited” to protect victimized older workers from erroneous arbitral decisions.157  
Suggesting that it had resolved this concern in McMahon, the Court relegated this 
point to a footnote, quoting McMahon’s assurance that reviewing courts will enforce 
the requirements of the statute.158  No further comment was needed. 
2.  Expedience over Principle 
The First Options case was decided in 1995, after both McMahon and Gilmer.159  
It might seem odd that the Court, having endorsed expanded review in McMahon 
and Gilmer, reverted to the manifest disregard standard in First Options.160  The 
reason for the Supreme Court’s fickleness might simply be explained by the cynical 
observation that, in each case from Wilko to First Options, the Court espoused the 
standard of review that provided the handiest justification for its ruling.  In Wilko, 
the Court ruled against allowing the arbitration of § 12(2) securities fraud claims.161  
The absence of meaningful substantive review supported the decision.162  McMahon 
and Gilmer conflicted with Wilko by allowing the arbitration of § 10(b) claims, 
RICO claims, and ADEA claims.163  Part of the Court’s rationale for allowing the 
arbitration of these federal statutory claims was the availability of plenary court 
review for errors of law.164  In First Options, the Court held that, under the facts of 
the case, the question of arbitrability was for the court to decide.165  To assign the 
question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the Court ruled, required clear and 
unmistakable evidence of party intent.166  The Supreme Court justified this holding 
by noting the narrowness of the scope of judicial review.  Like any issue submitted 
for arbitration, once the question of arbitrability is submitted to an arbitrator “the 
court will set [the arbitrator’s] decision aside only in very unusual circumstances.”167 
3.  Synthesis 
Though expedience apparently influenced the Court, a valid policy concern 
unifies all four decisions.  Wilko, McMahon, Gilmer and First Options all agree that 
a narrow scope of judicial review of awards deciding federal statutory rights is 
inadequate.  Where federal statutory rights are arbitrated, whether they arise under 
                                                          
 
157






 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 
160
 Id. at 942 (referring with approval to the manifest disregard standard). 
 
161
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
 
162
 Id. at 436. 
 
163
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (approving the 
arbitrability of ADEA claims); Shearson American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
238 (1987) (approving the arbitrability of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) claims); McMahon, 
482 U.S. at 242 (approving the arbitrability of RICO claims).   
 
164
 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 n.4.  
 
165
 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  
 
166
 Id. at 944. 
 
167
 Id. at 942. 
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the securities laws, civil rights law, or other federal statutes, courts need to apply a 
rigorous standard of review to ensure that those rights are protected.  Thus, in Wilko 
and First Options, where the Court directed the cases to the judicial system, the 
Court justified its decisions by stating that limited judicial review would be 
inadequate to protect the statutory rights at stake.  In McMahon and Gilmer, where 
the Court directed the cases to arbitration, the Court insisted the level of scrutiny 
sufficient to protect the parties’ statutory rights.  The Court’s concern for ensuring 
the enforcement of federal rights animates its pronouncements on the scope of 
review.      
4.  Reactions of the Lower Courts 
Many federal court decisions have reflected the concern to protect federal rights, 
either openly employing the broad standard of review espoused in McMahon and 
Gilmer, or refusing implicitly to apply the narrow manifest disregard standard.168  
The D.C. Circuit, for example, has applied the broad standard of judicial review 
adopted in McMahon and confirmed in Gilmer to awards resolving Title VII claims.  
In Cole v. Burns International Security Service,169 Cole was a security guard 
working at Union Station in Washington, D.C. for LaSalle and Partners.170  Burns 
Security took over the Union Station contract and required all La Salle employees, 
including Cole, to sign an arbitration agreement covering discrimination claims.171  
When Burns Security fired Cole two years later, he sued the company in federal 
court for racial discrimination.  Burns Security moved to compel arbitration.172   
Cole argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the scope 
of judicial review provided by the manifest disregard test was too lax to safeguard 
his Title VII rights.173  The court disagreed, holding that, when arbitrators resolve 
civil rights claims, courts should review awards for errors of law.174  In so holding, 
the D.C. Circuit relied on Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.,175 a Supreme Court case which held that Sherman Act antitrust cases, in an 
international context, are arbitrable.176  The Cole court found the following passage 
from Mitsubishi persuasive: “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
                                                          
 
168
 See infra notes 169-93 and accompanying text (discussing how some federal courts 
have balked at applying the manifest disregard standard).  
 
169
 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 
170






 Id. at 1470. 
 
173
 Id. at 1486. 
 
174
 Id. at 1487. 
 
175
 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  See 
also Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) 
(noting that “resort to the arbitration process does not inherently undermine any of the 
substantive rights afforded to the petitioners under the Securities Act.”). 
 
176
 Id. at 640. 
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resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”177  Standing alone, this quote 
from Mitsubishi does not necessarily imply a plenary standard of review.  The quote 
might simply mean that arbitrators should follow applicable statutory provisions, 
even though awards are not reviewable.  The D.C. Circuit eliminated this possibility 
by quoting McMahon’s assurance that judicial review “is sufficient to ensure that 
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.”178  Merging Wilko and 
McMahon, the D.C. Circuit held that, in Title VII cases, the manifest disregard 
standard means unrestricted substantive review.179  
The D.C. Circuit was right to rely on McMahon.  It had no reason, however, to 
practice verbal alchemy, transforming “manifest disregard,” which, according to 
Wilko, forecloses review for an “error in interpretation,”180 into judicial review for 
errors of law.  The D.C. Circuit should simply have stated that manifest disregard is 
not the correct standard to apply to Title VII cases. 
Other courts have strayed from Wilko, stretching the meaning of “manifest 
disregard” to encompass unintentional errors.181  These courts, though claiming 
adherence to the manifest disregard standard, seem to apply a “knew or should have 
known” test for reviewing arbitral errors.182  The explanation for this subterfuge is 
probably that some judges wince at the prospect of confirming a decision that would 
deprive a plaintiff of a federal right, whether arising out of civil rights law, securities 
law, or another federal statute.  They simply must intervene.  Murmurs of rebellion 
                                                          
 
177
 Id. at 628. 
 
178
 Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Shearson 
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).  
 
179
 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487; contra DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 
821-22 (1997) (rejecting Cole’s position that plenary judicial review should apply to 
arbitration awards construing federal statutory rights).  
 
180
 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). 
 
181
 See, e.g., Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assoc., 553 F.3d 1277, 1293 (9th Cir. 
2009) (vacating arbitrator’s award for misconstruing controlling precedent limiting the scope 
of in-term non-compete covenants); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 Fed. Appx. 
415, 420 (6th Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitrator’s award because it improperly failed to find that 
the non-disclosure of a felony conviction violated the Maryland Franchise Act.); DiRussa v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 695 
(1998)  (denying motion to vacate because “at no point did DiRussa communicate . . . to the 
arbitrators that the ADEA mandated such an award [of attorneys’ fees] to a prevailing 
party.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that arbitrators  manifestly disregard the law when they adopt a line of legal 
reasoning that no judge could reasonably defend); DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. 
Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (vacating arbitration panel’s award because the panel erroneously 
denied attorney’s fees to a prevailing complainant in a Title VII sexual harassment case).  In 
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit went 
even further by vacating an arbitration award that denied a federal age discrimination claim 
because the arbitrators ignored “the law or the evidence or both.” 
 
182
 See, e.g., DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 822-23 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting that if plaintiff had 
either explained to the arbitration panel that the ADEA mandates the award of attorney’s fees 
to a prevailing party or quoted the relevant ADEA section, the panel’s denial of an award of 
attorney’s fees to plaintiff would have manifestly disregarded the law).   
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against the manifest disregard standard have been heard for years in some quarters of 
the federal judiciary.   
For example, in DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc.,183 DeGaetano commenced 
arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange, alleging sexual harassment against 
Smith Barney, her former employer, and against her former supervisor.184  She 
submitted a memorandum of law to the arbitration panel in which she asserted that, 
if she prevailed on her sexual harassment claim, the panel was obligated to award her 
attorneys’ fees.185  The panel awarded DeGaetano over $90,000 in damages and 
interest, but it denied her attorneys’ fees.186  The panel stated that it did “not find that 
the conduct of the Respondents rose to the level contemplated by Title VII and 
therefore [the panel] den[ied] the requests for punitive damages and attorney’s 
fees.”187   
Ruling on DeGaetano’s motion to vacate that part of the award denying her 
attorneys’ fees, Judge Cote faithfully recited the definition of the manifest disregard 
test and then abandoned it.188  Judge Cote observed that DeGaetano was incorrect 
when she instructed the panel that, under Title VII, a prevailing party is entitled to 
attorney’s fees, because awarding attorney’s fees is discretionary, not mandatory.189  
Nevertheless, Judge Cote noted that plaintiffs in Title VII cases “ordinarily” recover 
attorneys’ fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”190  
Judge Cote concluded that there were no special circumstances justifying the panel’s 
denial of DeGaetano’s request for attorney’s fees.191  The panel, according to her, 
confused the generous standard for awarding attorneys’ fees with the more stringent 
standard for awarding punitive damages.192  Judge Cote therefore held that this error 
amounted to manifest disregard of the law.193 
This decision is hard to reconcile with the traditional manifest disregard standard.  
DeGaetano had misinformed the panel that she was entitled as a matter of law to 
attorneys’ fees.  Perhaps the panel felt that her misstatement of the law constituted 
“special circumstances” to deny such an award.  Alternatively, if the panel did 
confuse the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees with the standard for awarding 
punitive damages, as Judge Cote concluded, the panel did not intentionally ignore 
the law.  Judge Cote may have claimed fidelity to the manifest disregard standard, 
but she applied a “knew or should have known” test, which came perilously close to 
plenary review for errors of law. 
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Judge Cote, however, deserves no criticism.  Tacit rejections of the manifest 
disregard standard are welcome.  The evolution of arbitration since the passage of 
the FAA demands broadening the role of judicial oversight. 
C.  The Purpose of the FAA 
Before the passage of the FAA in 1925, arbitration was, for the most part, a 
process to resolve contract disputes between merchants.194  The principal architect of 
the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen described the FAA as a “great tonic” for those 
engaged “in the field of commercial activity.”195  The primary purpose of the FAA 
was to provide a method of dispute resolution for merchants and businessmen that 
would be less costly and less time-consuming than litigation.  Urging passage of the 
FAA, Charles Bernheimer, chairman of the committee on arbitration of the New 
York State Chamber of commerce, testified, “The most unprofitable thing the 
merchant and business man, or anyone engaged in buying and selling, can have 
confront him is that of litigation.”196  
The trend away from the courthouse and toward arbitration gained momentum in 
the early twentieth century.  Arbitration met the needs of those involved in trade 
disputes, since customs, known to arbitrators with experience in the relevant 
industry, often provided the preferred rule of decision.197  It is not surprising that by 
1920 “trade associations . . . [frequently] . . . require[d] their members to submit their 
disputes to arbitration . . . .”198 
Because customs replaced law and industry experts replaced judges, the need to 
review arbitration awards for substantive legal error was minimal.199  The framers of 
the FAA, however, could not have foreseen the widespread use of arbitration to 
resolve federal statutory claims.  While limited judicial review is appropriate for 
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 See, e.g., E. Gerli & Co. v. Oscar Heineman Corp., 258 N.Y. 484, 485-86 (1932) 
(confirming award that quality of silk delivered to merchant buyer was sub-standard); Red 
Cross Line v. United Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (alleging that a steamship operator 
breached a charter party by unreasonably delaying performance); Itoh & Co. v. Boyer Oil Co., 
191 N.Y. Supp. 290 (1921) (refusing to vacate award finding that the quality of hemp seed 
shipped to buyer was acceptable); Philip G. Phillips, Legislation and Administration, 1 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 424, 429 (1934) [hereinafter “Legislation and Administration”]; Philip G. Phillips, 
Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. L. REV. 590, 596-603 
(1934) [hereinafter “Rules of Law”] (listing categories of business claims arbitrated before 
passage of the FAA); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10 (1924) 
(statement of W.H.H. Piatt testifying, “Men have found that if they must arbitrate at once they 
proceed to carry out their contracts.”). 
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 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (testimony of 
Julius Henry Cohen). 
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 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 
Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) (testimony of 
Charles L. Bernheimer). 
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 See Legislation and Administration, supra note 194, at 426-27. 
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contract claims, the adequacy of limited review for federal statutory claims is 
dubious.  As Justice Clark observed, “Commercial arbitration has been highly 
successful in bringing a businessman’s adjudication to business questions.  But it 
would be vastly unfortunate if it became usable as a device to blunt or break social 
legislation.”200   
When Congress passed the FAA, it could not have imagined the type, the range, 
and the volume of federal statutory claims that would, as a matter of common 
practice, find their way to arbitration.  In 1925, Congress had not yet passed any 
federal securities law.  Neither the Securities Act of 1933,201 nor the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934202 existed, and there was no Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) to administer the thousands of securities arbitrations that are 
heard every year in its hearing rooms.203  There was no 1964 Civil Rights Act,204 no 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,205 and no Americans with Disabilities 
Act.206  RICO, the anti-racketeering law, was still 45 years away.207   
One policy of the FAA was to provide an efficient method of dispute resolution 
for business.208  Efficiency meant distancing the courts from the process.  To achieve 
this separation, the FAA established a narrow scope of judicial review, which 
prescribed nullification of awards for “fraud or other corruption or undue influence, 
or [for] some evident mistake not affecting the merits . . . .”209 But the decision to 
limit the scope of review to issues of gross procedural unfairness was based on the 
understanding that arbitration was an economical method to resolve disputes 
involving merchants belonging to trade associations, and between others in the 
business of buying and selling goods and services.  Congress could not have 
contemplated that the FAA would govern the arbitration of women harassed by the 
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 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d. Cir. 1953) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006). 
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 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006). 
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 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (“FINRA”), the only self-regulatory 
organization for the securities industry, operates the largest dispute resolution forum providing 
mediation and arbitration services for claims between and among investors, securities firms, 
and registered representatives. See FINRA, ARBITRATION & MEDIATION (2012), 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/index.htm. 
There were 7,137 arbitration cases filed with FINRA in 2009. FINRA, FINRA Dispute 
Resolution, ARBITRATION & MEDIATION (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResource
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sexual conduct of their supervisors, or of retirees wiped out by unscrupulous 
stockbrokers who gambled funds in Ponzi schemes.  One must question whether a 
civil rights claim of a black worker, fired because of his race, should be 
unreviewable if the arbitrator denied the claim because he erroneously applied the 
McDonnell Douglas210 framework to the exclusion of the more plaintiff-friendly 
motivating factor test approved in Costa for all individual disparate treatment 
cases.211  One must question whether an erroneous award denying a § 10(b) 
securities fraud claim should stand because a shrewd lawyer convinced a panel of 
arbitrators that the statute of limitations in § 804 of Sarbanes-Oxley did not apply to 
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act.212    
D.  Policy Considerations 
Applying plenary review for errors of law when a federally protected right is 
asserted reconciles the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA and the policies of federal 
statutes that protect substantive rights.  This approach permits the arbitration of 
claims asserting such rights, while protecting those rights with adequate review.  In 
addition, the approach taken in McMahon and Gilmer advances the FAA policy of 
honoring party intent.  When parties agree to arbitrate a federal statutory right, they 
reasonably expect that right to be protected.  The federal courts should honor that 
expectation.   
Efficiency is also a hallmark of arbitration.213  This policy, however, sometimes 
conflicts with the policy promoting party intent.  An expansive level of judicial 
review for awards deciding federal claims would, to some extent, decrease 
efficiency.  In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,214 the Supreme Court seemed to 
resolve this conflict of policies in favor of party intent.  The Supreme Court 
emphasized in Byrd: “We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of 
the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”215  The 
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 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (establishing the 
three-step burden-shifting framework for deciding individual disparate treatment cases). 
 
211
 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (holding that the mixed-motive 
analysis prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies to cases based on circumstantial 
evidence).  Suppose, for example, that an arbitrator believes that he or she must choose 
between the McDonnell Douglas framework and the mixed-motive framework to determine 
the validity of a claim. The arbitrator applies the McDonnell Douglas framework because the 
plaintiff focused primarily on disproving the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation. 
Finding that the plaintiff has failed to disprove the defendant’s non-discriminatory 
explanation, the arbitrator rules against the plaintiff, although there is strong evidence that the 
plaintiff could have met the motivating-factor test based on flagrantly racist statements that his 
supervisor made after firing him. 
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 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006) (providing that securities fraud claims may be brought 
within five years of the violation but no longer than two years after discovery). Before the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, federal securities law claims had to be brought within three years 
of the violation but no longer than one year after discovery. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f). See Lampf v. 
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 n.9 (1991).   
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 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
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 Id. at 219. 
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Court went on to declare, “the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a 
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered, and we 
must not overlook this principal objective when construing the statute, or allow the 
fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient dispute resolution of overshadow the 
underlying motivation.”216  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,217 however, the 
Court retreated from its statement in Byrd, declaring that it is “greatly misleading” to 
argue that Byrd recognized party intent as the primary policy of the FAA.218  Once 
again the Supreme Court contradicted itself. 
Even if the policy favoring efficiency is placed on a par with the policy favoring 
party intent, the two policies may be reconciled.  The diminution in efficiency 
occasioned by implementing the standard of review suggested in McMahon and 
Gilmer is not a serious one.  Efficiency arises from numerous other features of 
arbitration such as relaxed pleading requirements and evidentiary rules, limited 
discovery and motion practice, and an expedited hearing schedule.  Other features of 
arbitration such as the parties’ contractual control over the proceedings, privacy, 
confidentiality, and arbitrator expertise—which are all reasons that motivate parties 
to arbitrate—are untouched by expanded review. 219  It should be noted too that, 
while applying the manifest disregard standard, courts routinely analyze the 
principles of controlling law and sometimes delve into the hearing record to 
determine whether the arbitrator committed an error justifying vacatur.  If awards 
deciding federal statutory claims were subjected to plenary review for errors of law, 
the augmented role of the judiciary would not be as daunting as some might fear.220 
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 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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 Id. at 1749. The Supreme Court in Hall Street also minimized Byrd’s unequivocal 
endorsement of party intent as the FAA’s dominant policy. The Court stated, “Despite the 
[Byrd] opinion’s language ‘reject[ing] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] 
was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims’ the holding mandated immediate 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement; the Court was merely trying to explain that the 
inefficiency and difficulty of conducting simultaneous arbitration and federal-court litigation 
was not a good enough reason to defer the arbitration.” Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). The Court’s protestations amount to judicial hocus pocus. 
Even while attempting to diffuse the policy statement in Byrd, the Hall Street Court 
strengthened it. As the Hall Street Court conceded, the rationale for “conducting simultaneous 
arbitration and federal-court litigation” was the primacy of the policy of honoring party intent 
rather than the policy of promoting efficiency. 
 
219
 Professor Tom Ginsburg believes that “[p]arties will always be unwilling to arbitrate 
under a regime of de novo review, because it confers no advantages over going directly to 
court.”  Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-
Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (2010).  He does agree, however, that parties “will 
also be reluctant to arbitrate if the arbitrator is unlikely to resolve their dispute according to 
the agreed-upon law.” Id. 
 
220
 Scholars, while generally critical of the manifest disregards standard, have debated 
whether the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards should be expanded or contracted. 
Professors Brunet and Johnson argue persuasively for expanded review of awards issued 
under the aegis of the NASD (now FINRA). They state: “Unlike traditional arbitration 
involving contractual disputes, SRO [self-regulatory organization] arbitrations adjudicate 
nonwaivable statutory rights. In legitimizing mandatory SRO arbitration, the Supreme Court 
presumed that arbitration was only a procedural choice, not a substantive choice . . . The Court 
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E.  Statutory Rationale     
The statutory rationale for plenary review for errors of federal statutory law 
appears in § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, the subsection requiring vacatur when the 
arbitrators exceeded their authority.221  When parties arbitrate federally protected 
rights, they implicitly instruct the arbitrators to uphold their rights.  No sensible 
person would arbitrate a securities fraud claim or a racial discrimination claim if he 
or she thought the process provided no safeguards to ensure that the law would be 
applied correctly.  As noted above, a basic precept of arbitration policy is to respect 
the intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement.222  By erring, arbitrators breach 
the intent of the parties to ensure the application of statutory rights and therefore 
exceed their authority.  Moreover, the public policies vindicated in the statutes 
granting such rights do not permit the arbitrators to deny claimants such rights, 
intentionally or unintentionally.  Under § 10(a)(4), correction of such errors falls to 
the courts.223 
                                                          
also assumed that judicial review, although limited, would be ‘sufficient to ensure that the 
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute.’  As explained elsewhere, however, 
there is no meaningful judicial review of SRO arbitration awards.”  Brunet and Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 489-90.  See also Leroy, supra note 123, at 24 (contending that “Gilmer’s theory of 
forum substitution means that federal courts should vacate arbitration awards and court 
judgments [deciding federal statutory claims] at equal rates.”). But see Richard C. Reuben, 
Building the Civilization of Arbitration: Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 
113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1127-28 (2009) (arguing for the abandonment of the manifest 
disregard standard and against any substantive review because “from the perspective of the 
courts, it is hard to imagine a move more detrimental to judicial efficiency than permitting 
expanded judicial review.”); Hayford, supra note 14, at 841 (advocating limited judicial 
review such that “[u]nless the commercial arbitration award is flawed by the types of party, 
advocate, or arbitrator misconduct defined in section 10(a) of the FAA, or compels the 
violation of a well defined and dominant public policy, the parties to a commercial arbitration 
agreement are stuck with the result the arbitration proceeding produces.”). 
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 Professor Stipanowich has expressed the case for the primacy of party intent 
persuasively. He has stated: “[T]he central and primary value of arbitration is not speed, or 
economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather the ability of users to make key process 
choices to suit their particular needs . . . Choice is what sets arbitration apart from litigation. If 
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cost of various procedural bells and whistles. Expedited arbitration may also be utilized to 
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comprised of three grand old ships-of-the-line that results in a highly ‘authoritative’ decision – 
that too is an option.” Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2010).       
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 Numerous courts have held that a violation of a well-defined and dominant public 
policy is a judicially created ground for vacatur, rather than a ground for vacatur under § 
10(a)(4).  See, e.g., Lewis v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 500 F.3d 1140, 1150-51 (10th Cir. 
2007) (stating that the public policy exception is a “common law” ground of review); 
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One might argue that by invoking the intent of the parties to liberalize the scope 
of judicial review, expanded review conflicts with Hall Street’s holding that parties 
cannot contractually broaden the scope of review of arbitration awards.224  There is 
no such conflict.  First, the argument for expanded review applies only to awards 
denying claims of federal rights.  Hall Street did not assert such a claim, but rather 
sought to enforce its contractual right of indemnification against Mattel.225  Second, 
the argument for expanded review proposes that the courts interpret § 10(a)(4) to 
permit such review.  Although drawing on the policy to uphold party intent, the 
argument for expanded review is statutory.    
Since Hall Street and Concepcion,226 the survival of the manifest disregard 
standard has become dubious.  If the Supreme Court rejects the narrow manifest 
disregard standard, it will surely reject a broader standard of review for errors of law.  
The only alternative is for Congress to intervene.  It should consider the state of 
arbitration today rather than the state of arbitration in 1925.  If it views the FAA, not 
as a static law but as a dynamic one, it should fashion the FAA into a modern 
arbitration statute in a climate where virtually any federal claim is arbitrable and 
thousands of such claims are arbitrated every year. 
 
F.  Review of Awards Not Deciding Federal Statutory Rights 
 
Thousands of claims, not asserting federal statutory rights, also go to arbitration.  
Until Hall Street, the entire federal judiciary, following Wilko’s dicta, applied the 
manifest disregard standard indiscriminately to all arbitration awards.  It is absurd to 
apply the same standard of review to arbitrations resolving claims for breach of 
contract and to arbitrations resolving claims for racial discrimination.  The 
mechanical application of this flawed, single standard of review is like forcing 
everyone to fit into the same pair of worn out shoes. 
V.  STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS AND BEYOND 
This Part will begin with an analysis of Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,227 in which the Supreme Court applied de novo review to a 
                                                          
the public policy exception is a “judicially-created ground for vacating an arbitration award.”). 
If courts do not consider the“public policy exception” to fall within § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, it 
is unlikely that, without a directive from the Supreme Court, they would hold that § 10(a)(4) 
covers violations of federal statutory rights.  Professor Mercantel believes that the courts 
should reconsider this position and hold that when arbitrators issue awards that offend a 
dominant public policy they have exceeded their authority. See Jonathan A. Mercantel, The 
Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates 
and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 634 (2009) 
(arguing that “while section 10(a)(4) has not been interpreted as including the public policy 
exception in the past, nothing would preclude the courts from simply expanding their 
interpretation of section 10(a)(4) to include the public policy exception.”).  
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 Hall Street Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (holding that the 
grounds for vacatur prescribed in the FAA are exclusive). 
 
225
 Id. at 579-81. 
 
226
 See infra note 268 and accompanying text (declaring that the grounds for vacatur in the 
FAA focus on misconduct rather than mistake). 
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 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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partial arbitration award.  By doing so, the Court hinted that it might entertain 
broadening the standard of review under appropriate circumstances.  This possibility 
was extinguished in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.228  This Part will also 
discuss the public policy exception, which directs courts to correct errors in awards 
that violate well-defined federal public policy.  After approving of the public policy 
exception, this Part will discuss the appropriate standard of review for awards that do 
not decide federal statutory rights or violate well-established public policy.  It will 
conclude that federal courts should not review such awards for errors of law, even if 
those errors are manifest.  Finally, this Part will refute the argument that the proposal 
in this Article would defeat the efficiency of arbitration.   
   
A.  The Stolt-Nielsen Decision: A Glimmer of Hope 
 
The Stolt-Nielsen decision is both provocative and curious because the Court’s 
rhetoric did not match its analysis.  The Court concluded that the manifest disregard 
standard was met, although there was no showing whatsoever that the arbitration 
panel intentionally flouted of the law.  Rather, the Court merely found that the 
arbitration panel had made ordinary legal and factual errors.  
1.  Facts and Procedural Background 
A supplier of liquid ingredients to producers of animal feed, AnimalFeeds 
entered into contracts, known as Vegoilvoy charter parties, to ship products to its 
customers.229  An arbitration clause was a standard provision included in these 
charter parties.230  When, in 2003, AnimalFeeds learned that a Department of Justice 
investigation had revealed illegal price-fixing activities by shipping companies, 
AnimalFeeds brought a putative class action against a number of such companies, 
including Stolt-Nielsen, alleging antitrust violations.231  In 2005, AnimalFeeds 
served a demand for class arbitration on the defendant shipping companies.232    
The parties agreed to submit to a panel of three arbitrators the issue whether the 
class action was arbitrable.233  After conducting hearings, the arbitrators ruled that 
the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration.234  The shipping companies moved 
to vacate the partial award, and the district court granted the motion on the ground 
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 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011). 
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 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1754 (2010). 
 
230
 Id. at 1765. The arbitration clause provided: “Any dispute arising from the making, 
performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and 
Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant, broker or individual 
experienced in the shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate 
a third arbitrator who shall be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in 
conformity with the provisions and procedures of the United States Arbitration Act [the FAA], 









 Id. The panel was to follow the rules of the American Arbitration Association’s 
Supplemental Rules for Class Arbitrations. Id. 
 
234
 Id. at 1766. 
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that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law.235  The district court found 
that the arbitrators failed to make any meaningful choice-of-law analysis.236  Clear 
cut choice-of-law rules, the court reasoned, pointed to the applicability of maritime 
law, which, under industry custom and practice, showed that the arbitration clauses 
in question foreclosed class arbitration.237  The Second Circuit reversed, noting, 
“Had the district court been charged with reviewing the arbitration panel’s decision 
de novo, we might well find its analysis persuasive.  But the errors it identified do 
not, in our view, rise to the level of manifest disregard of the law.”238  
2.  The Supreme Court’s Distortion of “Manifest Disregard”  
The Supreme Court analyzed the case under FAA § 10(a)(4), which provides that 
a court may vacate an award when the arbitrators “exceeded their authority.”239  
Since Stolt-Nielsen also argued that the Second Circuit erred in holding that the 
arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded the law, the Supreme Court commented on 
whether the manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street.  The Court stated: “We 
do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008), as an independent 
ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set 
forth in 9 U. S. C. § 10.”240  Nevertheless, in addition to analyzing the case under the 
exceeded-their-authority test, the Court analyzed the case under the manifest 













 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 2008).  As a 
preliminary matter, the Second Circuit held that the manifest disregard standard survived Hall 
Street as a judicial gloss on the exceeding-their-authority ground for vacatur prescribed in § 
10(a)(4) of the FAA. Id. at 95. Applying the standard, the Second Circuit showed that, 
contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court, the arbitrators did not manifestly 
disregard choice-of-law principles by failing to undertake a choice-of-law analysis. Id. at 96-
97. First, Stolt-Nielsen’s brief to the arbitrators referred to choice-of-law in a single footnote 
without supporting authority. Id. at 96. More importantly, Stolt-Nielsen conceded in the 
footnote that the arbitrators “need not decide this [choice-of-law] issue, however, because the 
analysis is the same under either [New York law or maritime law].” Id. Furthermore, the 
arbitrators did consider the choice-of-law issue. Their award stated that they “must look to the 
language of the parties’ agreement to ascertain the parties’ intention whether they intended to 
permit or to preclude class action. This is . . . consistent with New York State law . . . and 
federal maritime law,” which, the Second Circuit explained, merely provide guidelines rather 
than fixed rules of decision. See id. at 97-99.      
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 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68 (2010).  The majority found that the panel had 
exceeded its authority.  Id. at 1767-68.  Justice Ginsburg disagreed.  She noted that Stolt-
Nielsen asserted only one statutory ground for vacatur.  Stolt-Nielsen argued that the panel 
had exceeded its authority.  She pointed out that by “referring the class-arbitration issue to an 
arbitration panel,” the parties had “undoubtedly empowered the arbitrators to render their 
clause-construction decision.  That scarcely debatable point should resolve this case.”  Id. at 
1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).    
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disregard standard, adopting AnimalFeeds’ definition arguendo.241  This definition 
stated that arbitrators have manifestly disregarded the law when they “knew of the 
relevant [legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of 
the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to 
apply it.”242  The Court concluded that, under the circumstances presented on appeal, 
this standard was satisfied.243   
Scrutinizing the Supreme Court’s analysis reveals, however, that the Court 
applied a more exacting test than that permitted by the manifest disregard standard:  
It engaged in de novo review.  In analyzing the award, the Court speculated that the 
panel impermissibly disregarded the parties’ agreement against class arbitration and 
imposed on the parties the panel’s view of public policy.244  However, the Court’s 
criticism of the panel centered on the weight the panel gave to certain factual 
submissions – an approach not permitted by the manifest disregard standard – and on 
the legal conclusions the panel made when endeavoring to resolve a complex 
question of unsettled law that might have vexed experienced judges.245        
It is striking that the Court faulted the arbitrators’ findings of fact.  The Court 
criticized the arbitrators for giving insufficient weight to evidence that the Vegoilvoy 
Charter Party had never provided the basis for class arbitration.246  It also chided the 
arbitrators for not being persuaded by expert speculation that sophisticated 
multinational commercial parties would never intend the arbitration clauses in 
question to authorize class arbitration.247   
To the extent that the Court relied on the panel’s “mistaken” factual findings to 
conclude that the panel manifestly disregarded the law, the Court misapplied the 
manifest disregard standard.  Any judicial review of the factual basis for an award, 
let alone scrutiny at such a microscopic level, clashes with the precept of limited 
judicial review.  In Wallace v. Buttar,248 the Second Circuit stated a fundamental 
principle of arbitration, noting that “[a] federal court may not conduct a reassessment 
of the evidentiary record.”249  The standard of review is restricted to manifest 
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 Id. at 1768. 
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 See infra notes 245-263 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court majority in the Stolt-Nielsen opinion). 
 
246
 Stolt-Neilsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769.  Justice Ginsburg countered with the panel’s 
suggestion that, if a class were certified, only parties willing to participate would opt in and 




 Id. at 1769. 
 
248
 Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 
249
 Id. at 193; see also Electro Sci. Indus., Inc. v. Dooley, No. 10CV1564AC, 2011 WL 
1883850 (D. Ore. May 17, 2011) (refusing to vacate award because the court has no authority 
to re-weigh evidence offered at the arbitration hearing); Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., 
L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “[m]anifest disregard of the facts is not 
an independent ground for vacatur in this circuit.”); French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a court will an confirm award with 
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disregard of the law, not the evidence.250  By sifting through the record in Stolt-
Nielsen and weighing the evidence, the Supreme Court ignored this fundamental 
principle.  Of course, the Supreme Court may establish any standard of review it 
wishes, but it is remarkable that, while professing fidelity to the manifest disregard 
standard, the Court breached the narrow confines of that standard.   
The Supreme Court’s criticisms of the panel’s legal analysis also failed to meet 
the manifest disregard standard.  The Court faulted the panel for not following “court 
cases denying the consolidation of arbitrations,”251 though, as the Court itself 
emphasized, the issue presented in the Stolt-Nielsen case was unsettled.252  The issue 
had been presented in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,253 but, the Stolt-Nielsen 
Court pointed out that only a plurality of the Bazzle Court reached a consensus on 
that issue.254 The Court chided the panel for concluding incorrectly that Bazzle 
“controlled” the “resolution” of the question whether the Vegoilvoy charter party 
“permit[s] this arbitration to proceed on behalf of a class.”255  
Though the Stolt-Nielsen Court was right in pointing out that Bazzle was merely 
a plurality decision and therefore not binding precedent,256 the panel’s reading of 
Bazzle was essentially correct.  The Bazzle plurality stated that, when an agreement 
is silent on the issue of class arbitration, the issue is for the arbitrator, not the courts, 
to decide.257  It was understandable, if not appropriate, for the panel to have relied on 
the Bazzle plurality decision, because Bazzle was the most authoritative statement on 
the issue.  Nevertheless, the Stolt-Nielsen Court lamented that “both the parties and 
the arbitration panel seem to have misunderstood Bazzle, [believing] that it 
established the standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining whether a 
contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration.”258   
                                                          
“erroneous findings of fact”); Success Sys., Inc. v. Maddy Petroleum Equip., Inc., 316 F. 
Supp. 2d  93, 94 (D. Conn. 2004) (observing that “the Second Circuit does not recognize 
manifest disregard of the evidence as a proper ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award.”). 
But see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating award 
based on “manifest disregard” of the evidence). Halligan, however, contradicts the view 
followed overwhelmingly by the federal judiciary.  See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Award: Manifest Disregard of the Law, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 471, 503 (1998) 
(calling the Halligan decision a “radical departure from existing arbitration law”). 
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 Wallace, 378 F.3d at 193. 
 
251
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 (2010). 
 
252
 Id. at 1772. 
 
253
 Id. at 1770.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 
254
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772. 
 
255
 Id. at 1770.  
 
256
 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 447. 
 
257
 Id. at 453. The plurality stated: “The question here—whether the contracts forbid class 
arbitration—does not fall within this narrow exception [gateway matters that are for the court 
to decide]. . . . It concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedure.  Arbitrators are 
well situated to answer that question. Given these considerations, along with the arbitration 
contracts’ sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration, 
this matter of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.” Id.  
 
258
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772. 
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The Court then proceeded to resolve the issue whether the parties had agreed to 
class arbitration.  Its resolution conflicted with the position of the Bazzle plurality.  
Emphasizing the FAA’s policy to honor party intent, the Court believed that “the 
differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators 
to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ 
mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve 
their disputes in class proceedings.”259  The Court stressed that the parties’ 
stipulation that there was “no agreement” to proceed as a class foreclosed any 
possibility of an agreement for class arbitration.260              
Joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting 
opinion,261 aptly accusing the majority of “indulging in de novo review.”262  The 
majority had not found that the panel had flouted the law.  At most, the panel had 
failed to anticipate the Court’s new rule restricting class arbitration.263  Although the 
Court claimed to apply the manifest disregard standard, it applied the broadest form 
of review.264 
B.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: All Hope Lost?  
The Stolt-Nielsen decision might have been read as an indication of the Court’s 
willingness to consider expanding the scope of judicial review under appropriate 
circumstances.  Such a reading, however, became untenable with AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion.265  In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA 
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 Id. at 1776. 
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 Id.  See also id. at 1766.  The majority made much of what they construed as a 
concession by AnimalFeeds’ counsel who said to the arbitration panel, “All the parties agree 
that when a contract is silent on the issue there’s been no agreement that has been reached on 
[that] issue . . . .”  Id.  Justice Ginsburg quoted the remainder of the sentence, which the 
majority had conveniently omitted.  “[T]herefore there has been no agreement to bar class 
arbitrations.”  Then, as Justice Ginsburg noted, counsel clarified his statement by adding, “It’s 
also undisputed that the arbitration clause here contains broad language and this language 
should be interpreted to permit class arbitrations.”  Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).    
 
261
 Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg argued that the case was not ripe 
for review by the Supreme Court because the panel’s decision was “abstract and highly 
interlocutory.”  Id. at 1778.  All the panel had ruled, she noted, was that the charter party 
permitted class arbitration.  The panel had not decided whether AnimalFeeds’ claims were 
suitable for class arbitration or who might be eligible for inclusion if such a class were 
certified.  Id.  
 
262
 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for “substitut[ing] 
its judgment for that of the decisionmakers chosen by the parties.”  Id.  It is curious that while 
applying a rigorous standard of review the Court insisted that the scope of review for arbitral 
awards is limited.  Id. at 1776.   
 
263
 Id. at 1775-76. 
 
264
 But see S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?  Stolt-
Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. at 52. (forthcoming 
2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791928 (fearing that Stolt-Nielsen may 
foreshadow that “courts would not only permit review of partial final awards, but would use a 
less deferential standard such as review for a mistake of law.”). 
 
265
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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preempts a California judicial rule prohibiting class arbitration waivers in consumer 
contracts of adhesion.266  To support its holding, the Court contrasted the scope of 
review of a court decision with the scope of review of an arbitration award.  After 
noting that a lower court decision is reviewed de novo for errors of law, the 
Concepcion Court highlighted the narrow scope of review under § 10 of the FAA.  
The Court stated: 
Section 10 “allows a court to vacate an arbitral award only where the 
award” ‘was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means’; ‘there was 
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators’; ‘the arbitrators were 
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing…or in refusing 
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy[,] or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced’; 
or if the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed 
them that a mutual, final, and definite award …was not made.’267 
This statement confirmed Hall Street’s holding that the FAA provides the exclusive 
grounds for vacatur.  The Concepcion Court, however, added that “review under § 
10 focuses on misconduct rather than mistake.”268  This conception of review—
foreclosing the correction of errors of law—dispels any thoughts that Stolt-Nielsen 
signaled the Court’s receptivity to any form of expanded review.  There is, however, 
one ground of substantive review that will likely survive Hall Street and 
Concepcion. 
C.  The Public Policy Exception      
Federal courts have long vacated awards that offend “well accepted and deep 
rooted public policy.”269  Courts have applied the public policy exception to prevent 
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 Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.3d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980).   In W.R. 
Grace & Co. v. Local 259, Int’l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), the 
Supreme Court stated that such a public policy must be “well defined and dominant, and . . . 
ascertained ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations 
of supposed public interests.’” (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).  
In United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987), the Supreme Court 
followed this strict definition of public policy.  Cooper, a Misco employee, operated heavy 
equipment.  After he was twice reprimanded for operating the equipment negligently, the 
company discovered that he was a marijuana user and fired him.  Cooper filed for arbitration 
under his collective bargaining agreement.  Id. at 33.  The arbitrator ordered Cooper’s 
reinstatement and the circuit court vacated the award.  The Supreme Court reversed the order 
of the circuit court, id. at 44, holding, that, although sensible, the  public policy proclaimed by 
the circuit court was not based on settled doctrine.  Id. at 35.  Although W.R. Grace and Misco 
are cases arising under the Labor Management Relations Act, the federal courts have accepted 
a similar public policy standard in commercial arbitration cases arising under the FAA.  See, 
e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Misco 
with approval and stating that awards resulting from the mandatory arbitration of federal 
statutory claims are subject to at least the same rigor of review that applies to awards resulting 
from  labor arbitration); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Lawrence Cnty. v. L. Robert Kimball & 
Associates., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that public policy review of 
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the enforcement of awards that would endanger public health or safety, or order the 
performance of illegal acts.270  For example, in Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, 
Ltd.,271 Diapulse manufactured the “Diapulse Machine,” a medical device designed 
to promote healing.272  Diapulse entered into a distributorship agreement with Carba 
engaging Carba as its exclusive sales representative in Germany and Switzerland.273  
When Carba began marketing its new “lonar” device in competition with the 
Diapulse Machine, Diapulse initiated arbitration seeking to enforce a non-
competition clause in the distributorship agreement.274  The arbitrator issued an 
award, which, without specifying any geographical boundary or time limitation, 
barred Carba from selling devices “similar” to the Diapulse Machine.275  The district 
court held that the award, which was both vague and overbroad, constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of trade violating federal public policy.  Accordingly, the 
court modified the award.276 
Although Hall Street and Concepcion, taken together, show that the Supreme 
Court, at least for the present, rejects expanded review, the public policy exception 
will likely survive.277  One can hardly contemplate that the Court would countenance 
                                                          
commercial arbitration awards is at least as rigorous as public policy review of labor 
arbitration awards).                     
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 See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of 
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 Id. at 1110. 
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 Id.  The Second Circuit held that the district court overstepped its authority, under § 10 
and § 11 of the FAA, by modifying the award.  Id.  Addressing the public policy issue, the 
Second Circuit vacated the award as “indefinite” under §10(d) of the FAA.  Id. at 1111.  The 
Second Circuit instructed the district court to refer the matter back to the arbitrator for 
clarification of the award.  Id.   
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 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (2010).  One author is concerned that Hall Street has 
abolished the public policy exception for reviewing arbitration awards.  He reasons as follows: 
“Hall Street held that the grounds for vacatur enumerated in the FAA are exclusive.  Since the 
public policy exception is nonstatutory, Hall Street has abolished it.”  Mercantel, supra note 
223, at 624-25.  Another scholar is more optimistic.  He states, “The public policy exception is 
well-grounded and well-established, and nothing in the Hall Street opinion evinces an intent 
to eliminate it.  It seems likely that courts will [continue to] recognize a public policy 
exception . . . at least for illegal arbitration awards . . . . Less certain is whether courts will 
extend that exception to include the broader class of ‘well defined and dominant’ policies 
recognized in Misco.”).  Reuben, supra note 220, at 1143.  Professor Reuben is probably 
closer to the truth. It is inconceivable that courts will confirm awards threatening public health 
or safety, or ordering the performance of illegal acts.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Int’l Ass’n 
of Machinists, 648 F. Supp. 2d 193, 194 (D. Mass. 2009)  (supporting the vitality of the public 
policy exception post-Hall Street); MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About 
Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 433 (2010) 
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an award that endangered public health or safety.  The Court would seem compelled 
to invalidate dangerous and illegal awards.  It is inconceivable that the Court would 
confirm an award that blessed the unlawful monopolization of the high tech industry, 
or the dangerous operation of a nuclear facility.  To justify the continued viability of 
the public policy exception, one might reason that neither Hall Street nor 
Concepcion considered or decided the propriety of the public policy exception.  
Furthermore, Concepcion’s pronouncement on the narrow scope of review was 
merely dicta.  The Hall Street Court’s use of the word “exclusive” must be read 
within the context of the facts presented in the case and the Court’s ruling, which 
merely rejected the right of the parties to expand the scope of review in an arbitration 
agreement.     
D.  All Other Cases 
This Article proposes that federal courts apply plenary review for errors of law 
when either federal statutory rights or federal public policy is at stake.  These two 
circumstances, however, do not apply to a sizeable number of arbitrations.  Any 
comprehensive framework should propose a standard of judicial review that would 
apply to the cases that do not fit the McMahon or public policy mold. 
When parties submit an issue for arbitration to a trade association or an 
arbitration organization, they often do not specify the law that will control.  In such 
cases, there should be no review for errors of law under the FAA.  The reason for 
this deferential standard is that, without instructions to the contrary, arbitrators are 
free to decide matters before them according to their own sense of justice.  One 
scholar has commented, “Arbitrators are not compelled to apply rules of substantive 
law.  The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to ‘do justice as he sees it’ and 
fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set of 
facts.”278  Given that arbitrators are generally not bound to apply substantive law, 
courts have no basis to review awards for legal error.  In Lentine v. Fundaro,279 the 
New York Court of Appeals upheld an arbitration award distributing the assets of a 
partnership in liquidation.280  Writing for the court, Judge Breitel explained that the 
court would not invalidate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator 
committed an error of law.281  He noted, “Absent provision to the contrary in the 
                                                          
(suggesting that the public policy exception survived Hall Street, and concluding that Hall 
Street’s statement that the grounds for vacatur in the FAA are exclusive must refer only to 
contractual expansion of the scope of review and not to judicially-created grounds because 
“[i]t is illogical to ‘cherry pick’ the [judicially-created] grounds that survive post-Hall 
Street.”); Codie Henderson, The Hall Street Hangover: Recovering and Rediscovering 
Avenues for Review of Arbitration Awards; Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 
(2008), 10 WYO. L. REV. 299, 314 (2010) (suggesting that the public policy exception will 
survive Hall Street because review for violations of public policy does not require a review 
into the merits of the award and also because “public policy has an established history in the 
law and would be difficult to supplant.”). 
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 Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).      
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In the absence of a directive from the parties to apply particular law, the policy of 
the FAA to promote efficiency in arbitration dovetails with the primary policy of the 
FAA, which is to honor party intent.  Any level of substantive review would conflict 
with the policy promoting efficiency since review injects cost and delay into the 
dispute resolution process.  Similarly, substantive review would conflict with party 
intent by imposing a legal regime on the parties against their wishes as expressed in 
their arbitration agreement. 
Parties often include a choice-of-law clause in their arbitrate agreements.283  
Although such a clause binds the arbitrator, it creates no obligation for a federal 
court to review an award for errors of law.  The Hall Street decision, which holds 
that the FAA forbids parties from contractually expanding judicial review to correct 
errors of law, is consistent with this principle.284  
State law policy may be implicated if an arbitrator misapplies state law, but, 
absent unusual circumstances, federal policy is not.  Long before enactment of the 
FAA, parties to arbitration agreements sometimes chose to be governed by state law, 
and the courts then, as now, honored such contractual provisions.285  Section 9 of the 
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 Id. at 385, 635.  See also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
259 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “arbitrators 
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Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 867 (1961) (stating that arbitrators for trade 
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prevent arbitrators from awarding punitive damages); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 491 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
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choice-of-law clauses”); Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive 
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 Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 579 (2008) (holding that the 
FAA does not permit the parties to an arbitration agreement to require the courts to correct 
awards “where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous”). 
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 In re of Wilkins, 62 N.E. 575, 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902) the New York Court of 
Appeals stated: “Where the merits of a controversy are referred to an arbitrator selected by the 
parties, his determination, either as to the law or the facts, is final and conclusive, and a court 
will not open an award unless perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct upon the part 
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submission authorizing it.” (emphasis added); see also Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E. 2d 633, 
635 (1972) (citing pre-1925 cases for the proposition that arbitrators must follow the law 
when the arbitration agreement so provides); cf. Leete v. Griswold Post No. 79, American 
Legion, 158 A. 919 (1932) (noting that arbitrators are bound by the law if the parties’ 
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FAA provides that an award must be confirmed unless one of the grounds 
enumerated in § 10 or § 11 requires its nullification.286  Congress elected not to 
include errors of law as an enumerated ground for vacatur.  Although Congress did 
not contemplate that this exclusion would apply to awards deciding federal statutory 
rights, Congress surely intended that this exclusion would apply to cases where the 
parties chose to be governed by state law.  It appears therefore that Congress, when 
passing the FAA, did not intend for federal courts to review arbitration awards for 
errors of state law.   
By denying substantive review in such cases, the courts are promoting efficiency 
in arbitration by minimizing federal court involvement.  State court involvement is 
another matter.  If an arbitrator reaches an erroneous decision on a matter of state 
law, the appropriate remedy is to seek vacatur under state arbitration law, not under 
the FAA. 
E.  Reduced Efficiency 
Opponents of the proposal in this Article will undoubtedly argue that, if 
implemented, the proposal would reduce the efficiency of arbitration.  Review for 
errors of law in awards resolving claims asserting federal statutory rights would 
arguably increase the role of the courts in the process.  For those who value the 
simplicity and economy of arbitration, such a development would be anathema.287  
This fear, however, is unfounded.  The prevailing narrow scope of review has not 
deterred lawyers from seeking vacatur of awards.  Courts have therefore been 
obliged to analyze the legal grounds allegedly supporting vacatur.  Judicial decisions 
plumbing arbitral awards for manifest disregard of the law frequently inhabit the 
case-law reporters.288  Implementing the approach proposed in the Article would 
probably not increase the judicial caseload materially.  
The expenditure of judicial energy needed to determine whether an arbitrator 
manifestly disregarded the law would not  differ substantially to if at all, from the 
time and effort required to determine if an award failed to uphold a federal right.  
The approach advocated in this Article might even reduce the burden on the 
                                                          
submission directs them to follow the law.)  New York statutory law and decisional law were 
particularly central to the shaping of federal arbitration policy and passage of the FAA.  In 
1920, New York State passed the first pro-arbitration statute in the United States, and the FAA 
was modeled after the New York statute.  See Joint Hearings before the Sub Committee of the 
Committees on the Judiciary, supra note 122 (Statement by Julius Henry Cohen to 
Subcommittees on the Judiciary noting that the FAA was patterned after the New York State 
arbitration statute, which in 1920 became the first pro-arbitration statute in the country); see 
also Brian T. Burns, 78 FORD. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2010) (reporting that Congress patterned 
the FAA after the New York state arbitration statute and sometimes looked to decisions of the 
New York Court of Appeals for guidance on how to characterize arbitration).   
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 See 9 U.S.C.A. § 9 (West 2011). 
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 See Reuben, supra note 220, at 1127 (arguing that “from the perspective of the courts, it 




 See Ashby Jones, Arbitration: Increasingly, It’s Not over Until the Vacatur Motion 
Fails (Feb. 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/14/arbitration-increasingly-it's-not-over-
until-the-vacatur-motion-fail/ (reporting that in 2010 federal and states courts issued 208 
written decisions on motions to vacate arbitration awards).  
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judiciary compared to the burden imposed by the manifest disregard standard.  In all 
cases where a party moves to vacate an award, the court must identify controlling 
law and determine if the arbitrator committed error.  The manifest disregard standard 
adds the step of determining whether the arbitrator knew the law and deliberately 
flouted it.  The scrutiny that the Supreme Court exercised in Stolt-Nielsen is an 
extreme example of the depths of analysis to which a court may resort when 
searching for manifest disregard of the law.   
If the proposal in this Article were adopted, a reduction in the judicial workload 
would result from awards not deciding federal rights or violating federal public 
policy.  Awards deciding state-law claims would receive no substantive review.  
Equally important, the approach proposed in this Article reconciles conflicts between 
FAA policy and policies of federal substantive law.  The manifest disregard standard 
fails to reach a sensible or workable reconciliation of these policies.  Having no 
review for awards deciding federal statutory rights is even less acceptable than the 
manifest disregard standard.  
Some might prefer a single standard of review to the standard proposed in this 
Article.  A single-standard approach, however, lacks the sensitivity to evaluate 
awards appropriately.  The relative strength of competing policies must set the 
agenda for a more finely calibrated system of judicial review.  Furthermore, the 
current state of the law recognizes a hodgepodge of nonstatutory standards of 
review, all of which could be discarded if the approach proposed in this Article were 
adopted.289  This approach would promote simplicity by eliminating three current 
standards of review for arbitration awards: the “irrational” test, the “completely 
irrational” test, and the “arbitrary and capricious” test.290  Courts would review 
awards for erroneously denying federal rights and violating federal public policies.  
In such cases, courts would not have to consider questions of irrationality or 
capriciousness.  In all other cases, the courts would provide no level of review at all.  
The task of reviewing such awards would fall to state arbitration law and state court 
judges. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court decided Wilko in 1953, the scope of substantive review 
for arbitration awards has bred uncertainty among the courts and dismay among 
litigants unable to predict what level of review the courts will apply or how they will 
apply it.  The Hall Street Court speculated about what “manifest disregard” means 
and whether it is even a viable doctrine, but the Court gave no answers.  Confused 
by the Supreme Court’s indecision, the circuit courts are divided on whether the 
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manifest disregard standard survived Hall Street.  Some courts apply the standard to 
all awards, whether the awards resolve claims of flagrant sexual harassment or 
claims of minor breach of contract.  They should not.  The manifest disregard 
standard is too blunt an instrument to handle such wide-ranging issues.  Other courts 
have dispensed with the manifest disregard standard.  These courts apply no 
substantive review at all to awards deciding federal claims, confirming troublesome 
awards that deny claimants their rights under the securities laws and civil rights 
laws.  This trend is likely to grow after Concepcion. 
Arbitration law needs a framework for reviewing arbitration awards that is both 
workable and sensible.  This Article proposes that awards deciding federal statutory 
rights should be subject to review for errors of law.  Similarly, awards violating 
federal public policy must be corrected.  All other awards should receive no 
substantive review in the federal courts.   
The Supreme Court has a disappointing record on establishing a sensible or even 
a comprehensible framework.  Wilko did not supply the answer.  Its ill-conceived 
pronouncement invoking the phrase “manifest disregard” has contaminated 
arbitration law long enough.  Hall Street’s wordplay with the phase “manifest 
disregard” turned the law into a puzzle.  Concepcion has transformed McMahon’s 
assurance of expanded review into a supreme fib, and the gap between the rhetoric 
and analysis in Stolt-Nielsen is as daunting as Zeno’s paradox.  The Supreme Court 
has had 60 years to set things right.  That’s longer than Moses wandered in the 
wilderness.  Maybe it’s time for Congress to act. 
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